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Abstract
This thesis is a study of neutrality, as a foreign policy, 
as practiced by Finland and Ireland, and of the constraints that 
limit the scope of neutrality as a foreign policy. Ireland's 
neutrality is affected by its close relationship with the Western 
powers. Finland's neutrality is modified by its position next to 
the Soviet Union. The simple distribution of power does not 
allow either Ireland or Finland to practice a classical neu­
trality, as does Switzerland. Furthermore, the forces of 
domestic political competition and maintenance of sovereignty, 
also color the formulation of these states' foreign policies. By 
analyzing these three forces, distribution of power, domestic 
political competition, and maintenance of sovereignty, while 
historically comparing Irish and Finnish foreign policy, we can 
describe and understand neutrality better.
A Historical Comparison of 
Irish and Finnish Neutrality
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare and explain the neu­
tralities of Finland and the Republic of Ireland, hereafter 
referred to simply as Ireland. The method of explanation will 
set the neutrality of these two countries in the context of 
constraints. That is, neutrality is the chosen foreign policy of 
Ireland and Finland because it has been the most efficacious 
course to follow in light of the constraints which bind them. 
Because of concerns for state integrity, the distribution of 
power, and the high political value assigned to staying out of 
great power conflicts, neutrality is used by the two states to 
accommodate the constraints which limit their options in foreign 
policy.
The method used to compare the forms of neutrality practiced 
by Ireland and Finland is a chronological one, introduced by a 
general overview of each country as it stands presently. Then, 
the development of Irish and Finnish neutrality will be examined 
from the emergence of each as a sovereign state to the present.
At intervals which signal a change in the importance of the con­
straining elements, an analysis of the two neutralities to that 
point will be given, and then the comparison will recommence.
Neutrality in a modern sense is a difficult concept to 
define, let alone practice. A neutral state must not start wars 
or belong to a military alliance. A neutral state must provide 
for a credible military deterrent, to prevent the transgression
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of its territory by belligerents. A neutral must follow the 
current guidelines of international law as it applies to 
neutrals. A neutral must profess to be neutral and practice a 
foreign policy which will not allow it to be drawn into conflict. 
Finally, a neutral must not aid militarily, economically, 
politically, or otherwise, belligerent states, though economic 
and political intercourse may continue.1
Unfortunately, in the modern world the distinction between 
war and peace has become increasingly difficult to determine.
For example, the complexities of international trade are such 
that the origins of some strategic materials are hard to deter­
mine, which complicates the verification of aid to belligerent 
states by neutrals. Furthermore, what does and does not 
constitute a neutral foreign policy is not universally agreed.
Today Ireland and Finland profess to be neutral and are 
considered neutral by much of the rest of the world. However, 
neither country is as purely neutral as Switzerland, which 
established its neutrality in an 1815 treaty. Austria, in 1955, 
also achieved international treaty recognition of its neutrality. 
But in both cases, the Austrian and the Swiss, foreign policy 
prerogatives were sacrificed to obtain international recognition 
of their neutrality.
Ireland and Finland have retained most of their foreign 
policy prerogatives and this adds to the uncertainty about the
1 Patrick Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in 
the 19801s (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 1984)
p. 3.
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degrees of their neutrality. The Austrians and Swiss are bound 
by international law to remain neutral, which is not the case 
with either Ireland or Finland, and it remains in the hands of 
the Irish and Finnish policymakers to establish versions of 
neutrality which enable the two countries to stay out of great 
power conflict without sacrificing their sovereignty or inde­
pendence in foreign policy.
Presently, in Finland and Ireland, neutrality enjoys a 
great deal of support among the electorate and the political 
elites. An example of public support in Finland for neutrality 
occurred in 1980 when former President Kekkonen attracted multi­
party support from approximately 80% of the electoral college in 
his bid for reelection, which was conducted on the basis of Fin­
land^ successful neutrality vis a vis the Soviet Union.2 Neu­
trality enjoys multi-party support in Ireland and Finland because 
it safeguards the sovereignty of the two states.3
Neutrality has also afforded a framework within which to 
establish the identity of the two states. The Irish and the 
Finnish manifest themselves, to some degree, in the international 
arena by their neutral stances. Helsinki, the Finnish capital, 
has become an international conference center.4 For example, it
2 Brian Faloon, "Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” in Irish 
Studies in International Affairs (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy,
Elso Press Ltd., 1982) p. 9.
3 Faloon, p. 11.
4 Faloon, p. 12.
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was the site of the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), and the Finns and the Irish were signatories of the 
resulting CSCE document known as the Helsinki Final Act.5
In the United Nations, the Finns and Irish have shared a 
similar mediatory role, both having contributed heavily to United 
Nations peacekeeping ventures. In fact since 1956, the Finns 
have sent 15,000 troops and the Irish 9,000 to man United Nations 
peacekeeping ventures in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Middle 
East, and Southeast Asia.6 Both Ireland and Finland have ex­
hibited a sympathy for Third World concerns in General Assembly 
voting, as one would expect of states which have only recently 
achieved sovereignty after centuries of great power control.7 
Neutrality allows them the latitude to express their sympathy for
the Third World. Were either bound by a military alliance to one
of the great powers, it would temper its stance on Third World 
issues in the General Assembly and elsewhere rather than injure 
its relationship with the great power.
Nonetheless, the distribution of power does effect Ireland 
and Finland, and their attachment to neutrality, with varying 
degrees of similarity. Both of these countries lie within the 
scope of great power influence. Ireland, which is a neighbor to
Great Britain, is also within the area of the United States'
5 Faloon, p. 13.
6 Keatinge, p. 50.
7 Keatinge, pp. 52-53.
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(US) power projection. With 3.3 million inhabitants, it is 1/3 
as big and 1/20 as populated as Great Britain.8 It is dependent 
upon Great Britain for 50% of its export trade and fully 80% of 
its export trade is with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) signatories.9
Ireland spends less per capita than any neutral in Europe on 
defense, apparently indebting it to the West, and more speci­
fically to NATO and the US, for its military security.10
It is not surprising, therefore, that Ireland, while not 
always a practitioner of solidarity with the West in the United 
Nations, is clearly tied by the distribution of power to a pro- 
West neutrality.11
Its great neighbor, the Soviet Union, exerts a similar in­
fluence over Finland, albeit with more of an emphasis place on 
defense considerations. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation 
and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) signed in 1948 by the Soviets and 
the Finns binds the survival of Finnish sovereignty, and 
correspondingly the success of Finnish neutrality, to Soviet 
security from advances from the West, most specifically 
Germany.12 In its preamble, the FCMA acknowledges, "Finlands
8 Keatinge, p. 77
9 Keatinge, p. 47.
10 Keatinge, p. 42.
11 Keatinge, p. 38.
12 Faloon, p. 9.
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desire to remain out of the conflicting interests of the Great 
Powers.”13 However, the FCMA requires consultations between the 
parties if an aggression directed at the Soviet Union has the 
potential of using Finland as a route into Soviet territory. 
Moreover, if a belligerent act aimed at both the Soviets and the 
Finns seems imminent, the Soviets have the right to transport 
troops through Finland in order to assist the Finns in the 
maintenance of their territorial integrity and neutrality.14
The FCMA is both a hindrance and a support to Finnish neu­
trality. It certainly reflects the awesome military power of the 
Soviet Union and highlights what the Soviets can do to Finnish 
territorial integrity if they see fit. If taken literally, it 
would destroy any claim the Finns have to neutrality. It is 
clearly a military alliance in time of war because it commits the 
Finns to allowing Soviet troop transport through their territory, 
and to a co-belligerency with the Red Army. But the FCMA is the 
lesser of two evils if one considers the fate of the Baltic 
states, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Their fate, total ab­
sorption into the Soviet empire, would have befallen Finland had 
the FCMA not acknowledged Soviet power and guaranteed the Soviets
13 The Preamble of the Agreement of Friendship. Co-operation 
and Mutual Assistance Between the Republic of Finland and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Signed on April 6. 1948. in 
Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975) p. 280.
14 Articles 1 & 2 of the Agreement of Friendship. Co 
operation and Mutual Assistance, in Mazour, pp. 280-281.
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a benevolent Finnish neutrality.15
The strength of Finnish neutrality has been demonstrated by 
the fact that the FCMA has not been activated. In order to pro­
tect their sovereignty the Finns opted to not join the Warsaw 
Pact, despite Soviet Invitation. But with a bow to Soviet 
power, the Finns also elected not to join NATO, for this would 
have initiated the FCMA by the Soviets. Both Finnish nonparti­
cipation in the Warsaw Pact, and nonparticipation in NATO were 
tolerated because of the FCMA.16
Forced by geographical realities to serve as a buffer state 
between East and West, but forced by diplomatic realities to stay 
out of power blocs, the Finns have moved to assert their neu­
trality by arming themselves handily, thus making the transgres­
sion of Finnish territory a potentially unpleasant experience.
In contrast to Ireland, which can mobilize 1.1% of its population 
in time of war, the Finns can muster 15.3%.17 The Finns have a 
viable army, air force and navy which are equipped with modern 
weapons purchased from the East and West.18 But with only 4.7 
million inhabitants and the 5th largest land area in Europe, they
15 Faloon, p. 5.
16 Max Jakobson, Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish 
Foreign Policy Since the Second World War (London: Hugh Evelyn 
Ltd., 1968) p. 58.
17 Keatinge, p. 42.
18 Aimo Pajanen, "Some Aspects of Finnish Security," in 
Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe, eds. Karl Birnbaum &
Hans Neuhold (Wein: Wilhelm Braumuller, Universitats Verlagsbuch 
Handlung Gesellschaft, 1982) p. 161.
have a big job of defense. Finland is bigger than Great Britain 
and Ireland combined. However, the Finns are well equipped and 
have a strong military history, and it is due, in part, to their 
military history that the Soviets have respected Finland's claim 
to neutrality, though the smaller country possesses only 2% of 
the population and 1/2% of the land mass of its larger neighbor.19
Finally, the domestic political frameworks of Finland and 
Ireland predispose them to neutrality. They are both modern, 
industrialised, northern European states, but each was dominated 
by its larger neighbor for centuries and only achieved 
independence in the years following World War I.20 Both 
countries were inclined to neutrality at their births, due to 
Ireland's reluctance to fight British wars and Finland's 
tradition of partial foreign policy autonomy during its period as 
a Russian Grand Duchy.21
Ireland shares with Great Britain the Westminster form of 
government, a common literary heritage and language, and a 
larger, more general, cultural bond.22 It also has close ties to 
the US. Fully 40 million Americans claim whole or partial Irish
19 Anatole Mazour, Finland Between East and West (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1975) pp. 1-2.
20 Jakobson, p. 3 and Alan Ward, The Easter Rising:
Revolution and Irish Nationalism (Arlington Heights, Illinois: 
Harlan Davidson, 1980) p. 142.
21 Ward, p. 151 and Mazour, pp. 12-13.
22 Terence Brown, Ireland: A Social and Cultural History.
1922 to the Present (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1985) p. 166.
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ancestry.23 Why, then, is it not a member of the Western 
Alliance. The answer lies in the separation of the six northern 
counties in Ireland from the southern twenty-six. At this time, 
a military alliance with Great Britain is heresy in Irish 
politics due to the presence of British troops and the British 
government in the six counties of Northern Ireland. However, 
the Irish, like the Finns, have strayed close to compromising 
their neutrality. As the FCMA would destroy Finnish neutrality 
if enacted, Irish membership in the European Community could 
damage Irish neutrality, due to the economic and political 
responsibilities it entails for its signatories, such as joint 
economic sanctions during hostilities.24
Currently, neutrality is parroted without opposition in the 
Irish Parliament, though it may be true that the neutrality of a 
member of the Labour Party is quite different from that of Dr. 
Fitzgerald of Fine Gael or Mr. Haughey of Fianna Fail.25 How­
ever, neutrality is likely to remain a cornerstone of Irish 
foreign policy as long as it continues to keep Ireland out of a 
military alliance while affording it the flexibility to derive 
the economic benefits of European Community membership.
Finland also had a border dispute with its larger neighbor,
but unlike the Irish, who use the separation of the north and the
south as a pretext for remaining out of NATO, the Finns make no
23 Keatinge, p. 95.
24 Keatinge, pp. 84-85.
25 Keatinge, pp. 116-117.
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such logical leap. Control of the territory of Karelia, the 
mythological birthplace of the first Finns and the home of a 
large Finnish ethnic minority until the end of World War II, was 
disputed by the Finnish and Soviet governments and was a justifi­
cation for hostilities with the Soviet Union in World War II.26 
But the border dispute was resolved at the end of World War II 
with the extrication of the Finnish minority from the USSR and 
their resettlement in Finland. This would be comparable to 
solving the Northern Ireland problem by resettling of the 
northern Irish Catholics in the south, if Ireland's leadership 
were to abandon hopes of reclaiming the northern six counties. 
However, unlike the Irish, the Finns could not exist with a 
border dispute with their infinitely more powerful, and more 
aggressive, neighbor. While the nonsettlement of the border 
dispute symbolizes Irish dreams of reunification, and neces­
sitates Irish independence from Great Britain in foreign policy, 
the resolution of the Karelian issue is an example of the aware­
ness by Finns that neutrality and sovereignty cannot coexist with 
confrontation with the Soviets.
Unlike Ireland, Finland is not a relative geopolitical back­
water and, as a consequence, Finnish Lapland separates the NATO 
forces from the Warsaw Pact, and to the south, whoever controls 
the Aaland Islands, as Napoleon remarked, holds a pistol aimed at 
the heart of Sweden.27 It was because of Finland's strategic
26 Mazour, p. 179.
27 Jakobson, p. 9.
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importance that the Germans passed through its territory in 1918 
and 1941 to engage the Soviets.28 International relations there­
fore assumes a high profile in the Finnish political arena.
The Finnish presidential-prime minister system of government 
is similar to the current French arrangement in the 5th Republic. 
As in France, it is the president who is paramount in foreign 
policy. It is he who must construct or protect a neutrality 
which both mollifies the Soviet Union and enables the Finns to 
hold onto their thoroughly Western, or more accurately, Scan­
dinavian ideological preferences and socio-economic organiza­
tions.29 The so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, named for 
Finland's first two post World War II presidents, has become the 
basis of Finnish foreign policy and it is the rock upon which 
Soviet trust in Finland is placed.30 As such, if one is to be
taken seriously within the Finnish political spectrum, one must
support and adhere to this policy.31
As is evident from this introduction, neither Finland nor 
Ireland is wholly neutral, nor is neutrality an end in itself. 
Rather, neutrality bends and folds to the demands placed on it by 
the European Community, the FCMA, Great Britain, and the Soviet 
Union, respectively.
28 Jakobson, p. 54.
29 Faloon, p. 11.
30 Faloon, p. 11.
31 John VIoyantes, Silk Glove Hegemony: Finnish Soviet
Relations. 1944-74 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1975)
p. 80.
Chapter 1
"The Struggle to Establish a Neutral Foreign Policy
After Independence"
Irish neutrality evolved as a means for the Irish to main­
tain their independence from Great Britain. The Irish separatist 
and home rule movements of the late 19th century were not 
enamoured with the prospect of fighting any more wars on behalf 
of the British empire. As a result, Irish nonparticipation in, 
and opposition to, the Boer War was an early form of Irish 
neutrality, and of its symbolic importance to Irish independence 
from Great Britain.32
Irish opposition to conscription in World War I was headed 
by separatists, including, Roger Casement and James Connolly, and 
the British did not attempt to impose conscription in Ireland 
until 1918, when the idea was met with massive resistance and 
abandoned.33 The Irish war of independence, from 1919 to 1921, 
added to the likelihood that the Irish would opt for a separate 
identity in international relations because many who opposed 
Irish participation in World War I also fought for Irish inde­
pendence .
But however much the Irish would have wanted to cut their 
ties with their powerful neighbor, complete separation from Great
32 Ward, pp. 43-45.
33 Raymond James Raymond, "Irish Neutrality: Ideology or
Pragmatism?" International Affairs. Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 1983- 
1984) p. 31.
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Britain was an economic and cultural impossibility. The bonds of 
common language, political systems, and for centuries, the same 
head of state and head of government, had firmly cemented the 
link between the two countries. Moreover, British trade sus­
tained the Irish economy.
Before Ireland was formally recognized as an independent 
state, the Irish Free State, in 1922, the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
of December 1921 had granted the British naval port facilities at 
the Irish ports of Cobh, Berehaven and Lough Swilly.34 At the 
time, Britain considered these facilities important to protect 
convoy travel between the US and Britain, and provide security 
for Britain's western flank in time of war.
During the 1920's it became evident that although the cen­
turies old attachment of Ireland to Great Britain would not end, 
it would be diminished by Irish independence. Ireland was, 
after all, still a part of the Commonwealth, if in a diminished 
capacity. In 1927, the Minister for External Affairs, Desmond 
FitzGerald, noted that if Great Britain was ever the target of 
belligerency, the Irish would come to its aid.35 And when the 
election of 1932 brought Fianna Fail to power, Taoiseach Eamon de 
Valera asserted that Great Britain and Ireland had a unique re­
lationship, and in time of conflict Ireland would show special
34 Keatinge, p. 16.
35 Patrick Keatinge, A Place Among Nations: Issues of Irish
Foreign Policy (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration,
1978), p. 84.
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consideration to its neighbor.36
It was during the 1930's that de Valera, watching League of 
Nation sanctions against Italy fail, turned away from the notion 
of collective security embodied by the League and decided upon a 
more isolationist and neutral policy to protect Irish 
interests.37 In 193 6 he told Dail Eirann that Ireland wished to 
be neutral.38 The 1938 Anglo-Irish Treaty therefore removed 
British claims to Irish ports. Britain had decided that the 
ports were no longer vital to British security, and were becoming 
an unnecessary luxury because of the ill will provoked by main­
taining a British presence in Ireland.39
As the storm gathered which would become World War II, with 
the German annexation of the Sudetenland and the Wehrmacht's 
rapid mobilization, Europe became restive. It was clear there 
would be no "peace for our time." In 1939, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, inquired if Ireland would regrant 
Britain rights to the Irish Defense Ports. This was refuted by 
the Irish.40 De Valera determined that the best path for Ireland
was to steer clear of the battle on the Continent, and he was
able to assert Irish independence in doing so. Irish neutrality
36 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations. p. 86.
37 Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland. Ulster and the
Price of Neutrality. 1939-45 (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983) p. 59.
38 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 14.
39 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 16.
40 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 89.
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in World War II was de Valera's successful attempt to keep 
Ireland out of the conflict while promoting a sense of Irish 
nationalism through the exercise of an independent foreign 
policy.
De Valera was also to find a policy of neutrality expedient 
for his party, Fianna Fail, which had opposed the partition of 
Ireland in 1921 and had fought a civil war over the issue. He 
claimed that Ireland could not take part in a war as Britain's 
ally so long as the northern six counties were occupied by 
British forces.41 Partition gave de Valera the political issue 
necessary to unite the Dail under his leadership, for no party 
was willing to sanction partition by actively and overtly 
abandoning neutrality, which would be the consequence of siding 
with Great Britain.
Moreover de Valera felt he had no choice but to remain above 
the conflict. He felt that civil war was possible if the govern­
ment were to conscript Irishmen to fight in Britain's war.42 
Simply stated, neutrality was the one policy de Valera could 
adopt which would unite the nation under his leadership, and 
force Britain to accept Ireland's sovereignty.43 This last point 
was evidenced by the British decision to accept the Irish refusal
41 Fisk, p. 382.
42 Fisk, p. 250.
43 Fisk, p. 250.
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on the defense ports and its nonparticipation in the war.44
When British inquiries were later made to the Minister of 
Defense, Frank Aiken, to determine if Ireland would commit itself 
to the Allies in return for a deferred reunification of the 
Island, they were turned down.45 Britain had once deferred Irish 
home rule, during World War I, and the Irish leadership was not 
willing to be taken advantage of a second time, especially since 
it was doubtful that the northern Protestants would agree to any 
such deal involving their separation from British rule. When it 
was noted, somewhat bitterly, that British lives were lost as a 
result of his policy toward the defense ports, de Valera replied 
that many Irish lives were spared by the same act.46
This is not at all to intimate that the Irish had reneged 
on their promise to show the British a special consideration if 
it were the object of hostilities. From the Spring of 1941 to 
the end of World War II, there was an effective Irish combat 
force within the British army. A full 60,000 troops and 100,000 
civilians volunteered to serve the British war effort.47 The 
Irish did not let themselves fall easy prey to the Germans 
either. The Irish army during the War grew to 40,000 regulars
44 Norman MacQueen, "The Expedience of Tradition: Ireland, 
International Organization and the Falklands Crisis," Political 
Studies. Vol. 23, No. 1, March 1985, p. 89.
45 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 16.
46 Fisk, p. 256.
47 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 91.
- 17-
and 100,000 reservists to meet the challenge.48
In several ways, the Irish were not wholly neutral during 
the conflict. Besides the Irish volunteers in the British army, 
Ireland supplied coastal reconnaissance and weather reports to 
the US and Great Britain in order to aid convoy movements. The 
Pentagon even contemplated decorating Irish military leaders 
after the war for services rendered to the Allied cause.49 So 
Irish neutrality was not, in the strict sense, complete. But de 
Valera had avoided sending Irish troops to battle the Nazis under 
Irish colors. He also managed to avoid a declaration of war on 
Ireland by the Axis powers. Irish neutrality during World War II 
was peculiar, given the assistance rendered to the Allies by the 
Irish military, but symbolically it was wholly successful, 
because Ireland had demonstrated to its citizenry that it could 
opt for a policy differing from that of Great Britain.
The result of neutrality on the citizenry during the war was 
one of increased introspection, as Ireland sealed itself off from 
most of the conflict on the Continent. The war forced it to 
become more self-sufficient, economically and politically, which 
heightened the feeling among Irishmen that theirs was indeed a 
viable state. Support for neutrality became a nationalist cause 
and de Valera noted during the war that straying from neutrality 
would be political suicide. By the end of the war, de Valera's 
"successful neutrality" had become so accepted that it had taken
48 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 19.
49 Ibid., p. 17.
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on a dogmatic quality.50
In examining the constraints placed on Irish foreign policy 
before and during the war, it becomes evident how de Valera was 
able to develop neutrality and use it to pursue Irish claims on 
sovereignty. We have noted that de Valera, as head of Fianna 
Fail, could not have survived politically if Ireland allied it­
self with Great Britain while the northern six counties remained 
beyond Dublin's domain, but Ireland's culture was intertwined 
with Great Britain's and adverse to Nazism.51 The Irish could be 
nothing but partial to the allied cause, which explains, partly, 
the phenomenon of Irish volunteers in the British army and the 
general benevolence shown to the Allies. Simply, Irishmen were 
closer to the British and Americans in their political history, 
belief, and values, than to the Nazis. And if the Irish policy 
of neutrality left them out of the fray, they would still assist 
the Allies in a way which would not compromise their neutrality.
The distribution of power was another factor which directed 
the Irish to aid the Allies. Ireland was situated geographically 
in a British and American sea. Had the Irish, for some insane 
reason, decided to exhibit a benevolent neutrality toward, or 
openly ally themselves with, the Axis powers, either the British 
or the Americans would have brought this, and Ireland's sovereign 
existence, to a hasty end.
50 Ibid., p. 20.
51 Fisk, p. 370.
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Likewise, the Irish need to preserve, and perhaps prove, 
that their sovereignty directed them to neutrality as the only 
feasible policy. For while coming in on the Axis side would have 
put this sovereignty in jeopardy, so would have openly siding 
with the British. De Valera felt that massive civil unrest would 
result if he chose the latter, and this was something a young 
state could ill afford, after the civil war of less than twenty 
years before.
Benevolent neutrality toward the Allies gave de Valera the 
means to unite the population, and aid those to whom the Irish 
felt bound, without sacrificing political capital or internal 
stability. British acceptance of Irish neutrality was the payoff 
for de Valera. It proved to an international audience that 
Ireland was an independent nation and that her larger neighbor 
accepted this independence in a time of great consequence, when 
overt Irish aid was most needed.
* * * *
The origins of Finnish neutrality are remarkably similar to 
those of Irish neutrality. The Finns, until the final days of 
World War I, had been a nation within a larger state. Sweden and 
Russia fought off and on for centuries to control what is now 
Finland. Under their rule, Finland existed as a semi-autonomous 
entity known as a Grand Duchy. And as a Grand Duchy, Finland was 
able at times to conduct a foreign policy separate from its 
imperial master.52 For example, the Finns were given special
52 Mazour, pp. 24-25.
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consideration with regard to the amount of the population 
conscripted for armed service.53 Like the British in Ireland, 
the Russians ruling Finland from 1809-1917 were careful, at 
times, not to excite a population on which they did not have a 
firm grip.
Finland achieved independence on 6 December 1917 in an 
atmosphere of unrest and disorganization during the disin­
tegration of the Russian empire. Nonetheless, the new Soviet 
state, which arose out of the ashes of the fallen Russia of 
Nicholas, was the first to recognize Finland*s claim to 
sovereignty, on 1 January 1918.54 This is not surprising con­
sidering the early Bolshevik support for self-determination for 
peoples formally under the rule of the czar.
Finland*s initial inclination was to avoid great power 
conflicts and adopt the foreign policy common to the nations of 
Scandinavia, which were neutral in varying degrees.55 However, a 
civil war and a territorial dispute with the USSR did much to 
unravel initial Finnish efforts at neutrality. On 28 January 
1918 a civil war commenced, with considerable great power inter­
ference. The Bolsheviks aided the Finnish reds and the Germans 
aided the Finnish whites. By the Summer of 1918 the whites, 
under the command of Baron Mannerheim, had succeeded in their 
encirclement of red resistance in the major southern Finnish
53 Mazour, p. 14.
54 Jakobson, p. 6.
55 Jakobson, p. 7.
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cities, which secured the victory.56
The next step for the army under Mannerheim was to expel the 
remnants of German influence, which was already on the wane as a 
result of Germany's weakening position in World War I. This was 
accomplished by 1919, and on 17 June 1919 Finland convened its 
parliament and became a republic.57
Any hope the newly incorporated Finland had of survival 
depended on the Soviet Union. It naturally wished to keep out of 
great power conflicts, the results of which had kept her under 
Swedish and Russian domination for hundreds of years. A credible 
neutrality policy was therefore sought; but credibility takes 
time to achieve, and the declaration of neutrality made by the 
new republic in 1919 was regarded with skepticism in the Kremlin.58 
Not only had the victorious forces under Baron Mannerheim re­
ceived assistance from the Germans, but the Finns had not 
renounced their claims to Soviet Karelia, the mythological birth­
place of the earliest Finns.59 The Soviets had valid security 
reasons for retaining Karelia, because it formed Leningrad's 
suburbs. The impasse over Soviet Karelia, and the German 
influence in Finland from 1918-9, slowed Finnish rapprochement 
with the USSR during the 1920's.
The 1930's brought a change in Finno-Soviet relations as the
56 Mazour, p. 44.
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Soviets watched with concern the rise of facism in Germany and 
took steps to secure their borders. In 1932, the Finns signed a 
Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviets, and in 1935 reiterated 
their desire not to be included in great power conflict, a signal 
to the Germans and the Soviets that this time the nonviolability 
of Finnish soil should be respected.60
On 2 September 1939 the Finns issued another statement of 
neutrality after the Germans rolled into Poland, following their 
consolidation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.61 The Baltic 
states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, quickly capitulated to 
Soviet security demands and the Finns were confronted with a 
similar demand on 5 October 1939.62 They rejected the Soviet 
offer of "protection" from Germany on the grounds that it 
violated Finnish neutrality and most assuredly would result in 
future Soviet domination. As a consequence, the Soviets claimed, 
on 26 November 1939, that the Finnish army had fired an artillery 
salvo into the USSR. On 28 November 1939, the Finnish leadership 
decided to hold fast to their previous rejection, which brought 
about further Soviet recriminations, some of which mentioned the 
possibility of voiding the 1932 Non-Aggression Pact. The next 
step brought a Soviet offensive, and on 30 November 1939 the 
Winter War was on.63
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The Soviet rationale for the attack on Finland was the need 
to defend itself from the Germans. The Soviet demand for a de­
fensive alliance, already accepted by the Baltic states, was 
rejected by Finland. Stalin countered with a scaled down offer 
that assured Leningrad's safety by the annexation of parts of 
eastern Finland. It also gave the Soviets military bases in 
Hanko, on the Gulf of Finland, and in the Artie.64 Finnish envoy 
Juho Paasikivi, a member of the moderate Agrarian party, turned 
down the Soviet offer because it violated Finnish territorial 
integrity, and correspondingly neutrality. The Finnish Prime 
Minister, Risto Ryti, a Social Democrat, then directed the now 
Marshall Mannerheim to prepare Finland's defenses.
The Winter War lasted 100 days and ended in a cold and hard 
fought stalemate. Though the Finnish forces managed a draw, Ryti 
approached the Soviets for a cessation of hostilities. The Finns 
had not been supported by the rest of Scandinavia or the Allies, 
and as a result remained desperately short of war material and 
foodstuffs. Again, Paasikivi was called upon to do the 
negotiating, and on 7 March 1940 Ryti signed the peace treaty 
which leased the Hanko peninsula, and ceded part of eastern 
Finland around Leningrad, to the Soviet Union.65
The Winter War ended Finland's hopes of remaining out of 
World War II. Short of supplies and stinging from the con­
cessions made to the Soviets in March, the Finnish government,
64 Jakobson, pp. 10-11.
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now controlled almost wholly by the Social Democrats, responded 
positively to German overtures promising aid. On 12 September 
1940, the Finnish leadership, headed by President Ryti and Social 
Democratic party chief Vaino Tanner, initialed a troop transport 
agreement with the Nazis.66
When the German offensive against the USSR began in earnest, 
the resupplied Finnish army, under the direction of Mannerheim, 
broke through the Soviet lines and regained all that they had 
lost. Mannerheim pressed further and managed to occupy most of 
Soviet Karelia, on Finland's eastern border. But Mannerheim and 
Ryti were not in league with the Nazis. The Finns were too 
suspicious of the German leadership to integrate Finnish forces 
into the Wehrmacht, and Ryti refused offers to join the Axis 
powers. The Finns described their collaboration with Germany as 
"co-belligerency," implying that the connection between the two 
was tenuous. The distinction made between co-belligerency and 
allying with the Nazis was not appreciated by the Kremlin, and 
Stalin was furious with the Finnish leadership.67
Nonetheless, Mannerheim refused to participate in the German 
siege of Leningrad or its attack on Murmansk.68 This benevolent 
gesture toward Allied convoy movements, and the Finnish conten­
tion that their war was one only of Finnish liberation, was un­
dermined by their signature on the Nazi sponsored Anti-Comintern
66 Mazour, p. 136.
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Pact of 25 November 1941.69
As World War II progressed and the German army began to 
disintegrate on the eastern front, the Finns still held onto a 
large chunk of territory which had not been considered Finnish 
before the war. However, realizing the futility of remaining at 
war with the Red Army for very much longer, President Mannerheim, 
the new Conservative Party leader of the republic, who had 
succeeded Ryti to the presidency in 1944, initiated peace talks 
with the Soviets through his new head of government, Prime 
Minister Paasikivi.70
The Peace Treaty of 1944 between the USSR and Finland was 
facilitated to a large measure by Paasikivi1s integrity. 
Paasikivi, the Finnish envoy in Moscow between hostilities, suc­
ceeded in establishing a personal working relationship with 
Stalin. When Paasikivi resigned in protest at his government's 
co-belligerency with the Nazis, his character was most dramati­
cally exhibited to the Soviet leadership.71
Paasikivi accepted Stalin's insistence that the Soviets had 
to protect Leningrad through a benevolent Finland. He took 
tangible action to dispel Soviet doubts about Finnish intentions 
and, using Finnish troops, drove the remaining 200,000 German 
troops from Finland into Norway.72
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The 1944 Peace Treaty was not the end point of the Finno- 
Soviet conflict and another round of talks was started after the 
war. The 1946 Paris Peace Treaty between the USSR and Finland 
was negotiated without the input of the Allies, excepting a small 
show of leniency by the British, for none but the Soviets and the 
British had ever declared war on Finland, and only the Soviets 
had fired a shot.73 As a result, the Soviets negotiated a peace 
highly favorable to themselves which left Porkalla as a Soviet 
military base on Finnish soil in Soviet hands. In addition to 
the reduction in territory suffered by Finland, the Soviets 
exacted $300 million in reparations.74
The end of the Second World War marked the first, and 
largely unsuccessful, attempt by Finland at neutrality. For a 
number of geo-political reasons, it is simple to understand why 
Finland's attempt to stay out of great power conflict, without 
sacrificing territorial integrity, was futile. Simply, its 
corner of Europe was claimed by both Germany and the Soviet 
Union, countries which had exhibited expansionist aims and a 
willingness to use their armies to achieve those aims. The dis­
tribution of power therefore adversely affected Finland. It was 
a corridor for German aggression in 1918 and again in 1941. The 
Soviets, renowned students of German military history, attempted 
to forestall the second German push through Finland during the
73 Jakobson, pp. 20-22.
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2 0th century by initiating the Winter War, but surprisingly 
failed.
Finnish co-belligerency with the Germans was not dictated by 
the distribution of power but by Finnish concerns for the main­
tenance of their sovereignty. While the Finns did refuse Soviet 
expansion on their corner of the Baltic, they also refused 
German offers to integrate their army into the Wehrmacht. The 
German army and German supplies were a means to regain lost 
territory, but under no circumstances was Mannerheim willing to 
pay for this by accepting German domination. Finish belligerency 
in World War II was not expansionist but rather an attempt to 
regain ground lost as a result of the Winter War, and to liberate 
parts of the outlying Finnish speaking areas. Taken as a whole, 
Finland fought in WWII to re-establish state integrity.
Unlike the Irish, whose domestic political framework was 
solid in its support of neutrality, the Finns lacked coherent 
domestic support. The Finnish Social Democrats, under the 
direction of Ryti and Tanner, became scapegoats after the war for 
initiating co-belligerency with the Germans and thereby increas­
ing Soviet suspicions that Finland could not be counted on as a 
benevolent neighbor. The Conservatives, or National Coalition, 
led by Mannerheim were a right of center party also willing to 
forego neutrality if it meant waging a war to liberate Finnish 
speaking people from Soviet domination. After the resolution of 
the conflict in 1946, the Soviets were suspicious of Tannerite 
Social Democrats and the Conservatives, due to their support
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of the war against the USSR.
However, the Agrarian, or Central Party, came out of World 
War II with their integrity intact in Soviet eyes, and this was 
to be critically important in the re-establishment of credible 
Finnish claims to neutrality. The personality of Paasikivi, and 
the refusal of the rest of the Agrarian leadership to participate 
in the co-belligerency government rewarded them with a great deal 
of foreign policy influence. They were the only nationalist 
party in Finland with whom the Soviets wished to deal.
Both the Irish and the Finns wished to stay out of World War 
II and only the Irish were successful. One is inclined to 
ascribe this solely to Finland having been a buffer state between 
the Soviet Union and Germany. However, the Finns also lacked a 
coherent domestic political leadership committed to neutrality.
By the end of the war, the Finns had found this political leader­
ship in the Agrarian party, through its leader, President 
Paasikivi. While the acceptance of Irish neutrality by the 
British was a factor in establishing the credibility of Irish 
neutrality in international eyes, Paasikivi1s integrity and 
Finnish fighting valour served the same purpose by gaining Soviet 
recognition of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality after the war.
Chapter 2
"Solidification of Neutrality in Post-War Europe as Finland 
and Ireland Cope with the East-West Division"
Formally, hostilities between Finland and the USSR were 
brought to a close by the Paris Peace Treaty, negotiated in 1946 
and signed in 1947.75 As is the case in most treaties ending 
open warfare, the winner was able to extract some harsh con­
cessions from the vanquished. But although the Finns were 
saddled with a Soviet military presence in Porkalla, a loss of 
12% in territory, and $3 00 million in reparations, the Treaty 
also contained a provision which prohibited the Finns from 
joining alliances.76 This attempt to neutralize Finland gave 
President Paasikivi a badly needed bulkhead to staunch the on 
rushing East-West conflict over the reformation of Eastern and 
Central Europe.
Paasikivi took positive steps to realize Finland's 
aspiration for neutrality by mollifying the Soviets at every 
turn, for it was they who presented Finland with its greatest 
threat. Paasikivi directed Finnish courts to sentence Social 
Democratic collaborators, such as Tanner and Ryti, to confine­
ment in Finnish prisons, which convinced the Soviet leadership 
that the Finns were serious about rapprochement with their great
75 Mazour, p. 260.
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neighbor.77 In addition, the cleansing of Tannerite influence, 
or "war criminals," from the Social Democratic party removed the 
possibility of Nazi collaborators participating in the immediate 
post-war Finnish government.
The Finns also took care not to provoke Soviet anxiety by 
not moving to integrate themselves with the reconstruction of 
much of Western Europe. In 1947 Paasikivi was invited to take 
part in the Marshall Aid program, initiated by George Marshall to 
ensure the economic remobilization of Europe. Much to Soviet 
delight, and at the cost of economic hardship to the Finnish 
population, Paasikivi rejected Marshall Aid in order to stay out 
of great power conflict.78
Paasikivi also refused to let the Soviet base in Porkalla, 
the reduction in territory, and the reparation payments become a 
point of contention in Finland's relations with the Soviets.
There existed little internal dissatisfaction with Soviet be­
havior in Porkalla, and the reparation cheques arrived in Moscow 
on schedule.79 By accepting the terms of the Treaty, while 
refusing Marshall Aid and punishing the Finnish Nazi colla­
borators, Paasikivi was able, in a remarkably short time, to 
evoke trust among the Kremlin leadership.
Paasikivi was able to make these tangible gestures towards 
the Soviet Union immediately after the war by maintaining a
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consensus in his government on achieving good relations with the 
Soviets. The governments from 1945-8 were coalitions formed 
between the Agrarian, or Central Party, the SKDL, or Communist 
Party, and those Social Democrats not tainted by German colla­
boration.80 Both the Agrarians and the Communists were committed 
to Soviet accommodation. The Social Democrats and the Agrarians 
were committed to maintaining Finland's free market economic or­
ganization and a liberal democratic political structure. Thus, 
the Soviet Union's security needs were accommodated without 
changing Finland's political or economic organization; an anomaly 
in Eastern and Central Europe that the USSR accepted.
Demonstrating, rhetorically, his concern for Soviet security 
interests, Paasikivi stated in 1947, "If anyone tries to attack 
the Soviet Union through our territory we shall together with the 
Soviet Union fight against the aggressor as hard and for as long 
as we can."81 The Soviets wanted an assurance in writing, how­
ever, as they had already obtained from Hungary and Romania. On 
23 February 1948, therefore the day of the Communist takeover in 
Prague, Paasikivi was informed by the Soviet envoy that he should 
come to Moscow to negotiate a mutual defense treaty.82
With this request, the Soviets tested the resolve of the 
Finns to maintain their sovereignty within a liberal democratic 
system while nations to the south of Finland were capitulating to
80 Vloyantes, p. 70.
81 Jakobson, p. 38.
82 Jakobson, pp. 36-37.
-32-
Soviet demands. Paasikivi asked for enough time to meet with 
the Finnish parliamentary leadership, and he attempted to include 
the widest possible spectrum of political beliefs on his nego­
tiating team. He was, of course, under pressure to negotiate a 
treaty with the Soviets that would prove satisfactory to the USSR 
while retaining Finnish prerogatives in foreign policy. He also 
had to sell the treaty to the Finnish parliament, which was not 
entirely predisposed to meet Soviet demands, which called for the 
security of Leningrad and the Northwestern USSR.83
The result of the negotiating process was the 1948 Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), which was 
ratified by the Finnish parliament on 28 April 1948. It was to 
last for ten years.84 The Treaty, as outlined in the intro­
duction of this paper, provided the Soviet Union with security 
from aggression through Finnish territory. It provided for con­
sultations if a threat of aggression was perceived, and acknow­
ledged the Finnish claim to neutrality. It made no reference to 
the reorganization, on Soviet lines, of the political or economic 
structures of Finland. The FCMA set down on paper what Paasikivi 
was already committed to in relations with the Soviets. It came 
to be known as the Paasikivi, or Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.85 
Kekkonen was to succeed Paasikivi as President.
The Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was tested that very year, 1948.
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Distaste for the Finnish Communist Party was growing in the 
electorate, formented by Social Democratic accusations that the 
Minister of Interior, the Communist Yrjo Leino, had deported 
Finnish Social Democrats to the Soviet Union in 1948 to serve the 
remainder of their prison terms for Nazi collaboration.86 In 
addition to this charge, it was widely rumored that the Com­
munists, who favored extremely close links with the Soviets, were 
planning a coup d'etat to effect this end. While none of the 
accusations could be substantiated, they were sufficient to cast 
doubts on the patriotic resolve of the Communist Party and 
brought the Social Democrats, under the leadership of Karl 
Fagerholm, to victory in the parliamentary elections.87
The 1948 Fagerholm government proved to be shortlived, main­
ly because of Agrarian distrust and Soviet displeasure. How­
ever, the 1948 political gambit by the Social Democrats did 
accomplish two things of relatively long-lasting duration. They 
and the Communists remained enemies until the mid 1960's, and the 
Soviets were convinced of the complete unreliability of Social 
Democratic led governments in Finland.88
The 1950's brought into focus the impending retirement of 
Paasikivi, who announced he would not seek reelection in 1956.
As the Social Democratic collaborators, Ryti and Tanner, were 
released, having done their penance, it was speculated that
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Tanner, in particular, might head the Social Democratic campaign 
for the presidency. The Soviet Union watched these events 
unfold, and some particularly livid articles in Izvestia warned 
Tanner and Ryti to stay out of the race.89 It was becoming clear 
that a corollary of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was that, in 
order to satisfy Soviet security needs, the Soviets had to be 
able to trust the Finnish leadership. Therefore, Tanner and Ryti 
had to be excluded from Finnish politics if relations with the 
Soviets were to remain cordial, a price the Social Democrats were 
not yet ready to pay.
As the 1955 presidential election drew near, Paasikivi and 
the Agrarian presidential candidate, Prime Minister Urho 
Kekkonen, were invited to Moscow two years ahead of schedule to 
renegotiate the FCMA.90 Soviet Premier Nickolai Bulganin 
informed the Finns that, although the base in Porkalla was leased 
to the Soviet Union for fifty years under the terms of the Paris 
Peace Treaty, and contributed to the defense of Leningrad by 
securing the Gulf of Finland, the Soviets would return it to 
Finnish control by 1956.91
The Soviets were evincing their trust in Finnish intentions. 
They were aware that the Finns knew that Leningrad's defense and 
Finland's integrity were inexorably intertwined. But the Soviets 
might also have had an ulterior motive for pulling out of
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Porkalla early. The 1956 Finnish presidential election was 
apparently going to be decided at the eleventh hour, and the 
Soviets were willing to convert the return of Porkalla into 
political capital for the Agrarian candidate, Kekkonen.
Partly because of his participation in the negotiations 
which removed the last territorial barrier to Finnish neutrality, 
Kekkonen was inaugurated President in 1956. His victory was an 
important event in retaining good relations with the USSR. The 
election had been extremely close and was decided by only one 
vote out of three hundred in the Finnish electoral college. 
Kekkonen's opponent, Social Democrat Karl Fagerholm, was clearly 
distrusted by the Soviets, but by espousing the foreign policy 
line of his predecessor and emphasizing his own role in the 
return of Porkalla, Kekkonen won both the trust of the Kremlin 
and the election.92 However, the opposition of the largest 
party, the Social Democrats, evident in the closeness of the 
electoral college results, suggested that a working consensus for 
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was precarious. This raised the 
possibility of future confrontations with the USSR which could 
bring Finnish sovereignty into question.
The credibility of Finnish neutrality had to be established 
in the West as well as in the East. It was thought by some in 
the West that Finland was little more than a Soviet puppet. Al­
though the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line gave a preponderant role to 
gestures designed to curry Soviet favor, the Finns did stop short
92 Vloyantes, p. 80.
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of being drawn behind the Iron Curtain. In 1955, they refused to 
join the Warsaw Pact, discouraging Soviet consolidation 
attempts.93 They felt able to say no to the Soviet invitation 
because they had attempted to demilitarize Scandinavia. In 1952, 
Prime Minister Kekkonen advanced the idea of a pan-Scandinavian 
neutrality. It failed because NATO members Iceland, Norway, and 
Denmark refused to participate.94 However, in a gesture to the 
Finns, German forces were kept out of NATO exercises in 
Scandinavia to avoid fueling the Soviet paranoia.95
1955 was the year Finland joined the United Nations where it 
proceeded to pursue an activist course in promoting the United 
Nations' mediatory role in hostilities.96 The Finns were also 
careful not to let their activism in the United Nations bring 
them into conflict with Soviet imperialism. For instance, al­
though the Finns participated in the 1956 Sinai Peacekeeping 
Force, and condemned Britain, France, and Israel, for their role 
in the 1956 Middle East War, they did not protest the Soviet 
Union's violent repression of Hungarian nationalists, which coin­
cided with the Suez crisis.97
By 1957 the Soviets, having vacated Porkalla a year earlier, 
proclaimed a new interpretation of the FCMA. They now considered
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the agreement foremost as a guarantee of Finnish neutrality, and 
only secondarily as a representation of Soviet Security 
interests.98 Unfortunately, 1957 also marked the comeback of 
Vaino Tanner as he resumed his post as chairman of the Social 
Democratic Party. Again, relations between the two nations 
cooled because Tanner's political reemergence was coupled with a 
Social Democratic victory in the parliamentary elections, which 
once again gave the premiership to Karl Fagerholm.99
The Fagerholm government provoked a crisis in Finland known 
as the "Nightfrost."10° Soviet displeasure with the reascendent 
Social Democrats was not lost on President Kekkonen, who under­
stood that the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line depended in large part on 
who occupied the major cabinet posts.
In order to maintain his credibility with the Soviet Union, 
which rested largely on his own relationship with Moscow's 
leadership, Kekkonen could not allow the Agrarians to remain in a 
coalition headed by Tannerite Social Democrats which included the 
Conservatives.101 This provoked a loss of confidence in the 
Finnish parliament and the fall of the Fagerholm government, 
which brought in a Center-Left coalition. The new government 
included the Social Democrats, minus Fagerholm and the 
Tannerites, and gave the premiership back to the Agrarians.
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This arrangement was not threatened until 1961.
1961 signalled the start of another campaign for the presi­
dency. Olavi Honka, a former jurist, was supported by the Social 
Democrats and the Conservatives in a run against Kekkonen.102 
However, his campaign was unsuccessful because a complex series 
of events, perhaps orchestrated by the Soviets, gave Kekkonen an 
outstanding foreign policy victory, and enough political clout to 
win reelection.
The Berlin Wall crisis of August 1961, and the end of dis­
armament talks between the Americans and the Soviets, had renewed 
East-West tensions. With Superpower relations clearly on the 
wane, Kekkonen was again requested to journey eastward for con­
sultations on the FCMA. The invitation was delivered on 3 0 
October 1961, the day the Soviet Union exploded a fifty megaton 
weapon, an ominous coincidence.103
Kekkonen was not in Helsinki to receive Kruschev's request. 
Instead, he was in Hawaii, relaxing after a summit with President 
Kennedy at which he had received assurances from the president 
that Finland's special neutrality was understood in 
Washington.104 Kekkonen did not immediately respond to the 
Soviet threat. He sent his foreign minister to the Kremlin in 
order to buy himself some time and prevent any rash actions by 
the USSR.
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Facing a tight race for reelection, Kekkonen could not 
simultaneously enter negotiations with the Soviet Union and hope 
to allay Soviet fear about Finnish credibility. To the Soviet 
Union, credibility in Finland rested upon Kekkonen's shoulders. 
Unless Kekkonen could convince the Soviets that he would remain 
president, his negotiating position would weaken correspondingly. 
He therefore dissolved parliament and called for early elections. 
This move forced the Conservatives and the Social Democrats to 
break with solidarity in order to win seats in the parliament.
It also meant that the Social Democratic and Conservative 
alliance in support of Olavi Honka, known as the Honka Front, was 
thrown into disarray, for the Social Democrats and Conservatives 
could hardly contest each other over parliamentary seats and hope 
to reconcile their differences for a common presidential 
candidate. As a result, the Honka Front split apart and Honka 
withdrew from the campaign, assuring Kekkonen's reelection.105
Only then, on 18 November 1961, did Kekkonen present himself 
to Kruschev in Novosibirsk, Siberia, where he convinced the 
General Secretary that the USSR had nothing to gain by invoking 
the defense clause of the FCMA. Kekkonen argued that the crisis 
in East-West relations was past. By militarizing Finland with 
the Red Army, Kekkonen argued, Kruschev would provoke counter 
measures by the NATO countries in Scandinavia and considerable 
anti-Soviet propaganda would result. Instead, Kekkonen sug­
gested, with his reelection assured and Finno-Soviet relations
105 Jakobson, p. 78.
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put on firm ground for six more years, the General Secretary 
should rescind his proposal, and reaffirm his trust in the 
Kekkonen leadership and Finland's desire to remain out of great 
power competition.106
Kekkonen's trip to Siberia established an important pre­
cedent in the interpretation of the FCMA. For it to be invoked, 
both parties had to recognize aggression. In this case, the 
Finns clearly had not. The Finns established the right to say no 
if perceived aggression was simply a Soviet fabrication because 
in 1961 NATO was not about to roll through Finland en route to 
Leningrad. Kekkonen's victory at Novosibirsk also sealed his 
reelection for it established, without a doubt, his personal 
importance to Finland's international credibility. As Kruschev 
bluntly put it, "Whoever is for Kekkonen is for friendship with 
the Soviet Union and whoever is against Kekkonen is against 
friendship with the Soviet Union."107
In 1952 Kekkonen advocated a nuclear free and neutral 
Scandinavia while concurrently applying for membership in the 
Nordic Council, which he achieved in 1955.108 Again, in 1963, 
Kekkonen called for Scandinavia to become nuclear free and for 
its NATO members to opt for neutrality. Its aim was to reduce 
the strategic importance of the North, and this was partly 
accomplished in 1964 with the removal of nuclear weapons from
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Scandinavian soil by the NATO countries.109 In 1965 he attempted 
to demilitarize Lapland, where the Warsaw Pact forces stand toe 
to toe with NATO on the Norwegian-Soviet border.110 In the 
United Nations the Finns advocated an active mediatory role but 
stayed clear of criticism of the USSR whenever possible. They 
participated heavily in peacekeeping ventures in order to 
establish their role as mediators and promoters of stability. In 
all, over 15,000 Finnish troops have served in such widely 
divergent locals as the Congo, Cyprus, Laos, the Golan Heights, 
and the Sinai.111
Complimenting Finland's high profile abroad as an active 
mediator, acceptable to both East and West, was a gradual change 
in the leadership profile of the Social Democrats. Fagerholm, 
Tanner, and Ryti had retired, and by 1965 the Soviets announced 
to Kekkonen that a Social Democrat led government was no long­
er threatening to them.112 The 1966 Social Democratic victory 
was even applauded by Premier Kosygin, and he communicated to the 
Social Democrats that the government of Social Democrat Paasio 
had his complete trust. This, of course, was due to the support 
given the Social Democrats by the Agrarians and the Communists, 
as well as the absence of Tannerites in the rejuvenated Social
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Democrat ic leadership.113
By the late 1960's detente was starting to accelerate, and 
the Finns played an active part, hosting the opening round of 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in 1969.114 In 1972 the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in 
Helsinki, with the Finns taking part as one of the neutral and 
nonaligned (NNA) countries, further solidifying recognition of 
the Finnish neutral role. The Helsinki Final Act, signed at the 
conclusion of the CSCE, was a highwater mark in detente, with 
the host Finns actively involved throughout.115
Coinciding with the emergence of Finnish neutrality was 
Finland's attempt to integrate itself into the Western European 
economic prosperity without sacrificing its trade relationship 
with the USSR. On 27 March 1961, President Kekkonen negotiated 
an agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) that 
offered Finland the opportunity to enjoy the economic benefits of 
the free trade area without actually joining the organization.
In addition, the Finns could continue their Most Favoured Nation 
treaty with the Soviets without endangering their new found EFTA 
affiliation.116
In December 1967 the Finns joined the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the successor of the
113 Vloyantes, p. 13 6.
114 Vloyantes, p. 152.
115 Faloon, p. 8.
116 Jakobson, p. 61.
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Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and was a 
signatory of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
as Well.117 To balance Finland's growing involvement with 
Western economic organizations, Kekkonen reassured the Soviets by 
signing a twenty year extension of the FCMA in 1970, and in 1971 
initiating a bilateral trade agreement with the Soviet sponsored 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.118 After Kekkonen 
strengthened his formal economic ties with the East, he was ready 
to attempt a separate agreement with the European Economic 
Community. This move was especially important to Finland because 
of Britain's recent entry. Within the EFTA, Great Britain had 
been one of Finland's largest trading partners, due to British 
use of Finnish timber products. Finland's negotiations with the 
Community took place at the end of another presidential term, and 
the combination of Kekkonen possibly leaving the presidency and 
further Finnish integration with the West worried the Soviets. 
Once again, the unique relationship between Kekkonen and the 
Kremlin proved to be the deciding factor. Kekkonen was reelected 
with almost complete unanimity and Finland was able to conclude 
an external association agreement with the Community in 1974.119 
Though Finland was not a member of the Community, its products 
would not be barred from the Community's free trade area, and its 
relationship with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
117 Jakobson, p. 61.
118 Faloon, p. 8.
119 Faloon, p. 8.
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would not jeopardize its Western European contacts.
By the end of this time period, it had become highly advan­
tageous, politically, for Finland to support a policy of neu­
trality which accommodated the security interests of the Soviet 
Union through the consistent application of the Paasikivi- 
Kekkonen line. Finland's mainstream politicians all advocated 
neutrality, but as Fagerholm found out twice, it was possible to 
subscribe to an interpretation of neutrality which failed to give 
sufficient notice of the interest of the Soviet Union in the 
Finnish election results. If a man won an election in Finland, 
who had previously supported a cause detrimental to the Soviet 
Union, like Nazi collaboration, his chances of staying in office 
were nil. And it was only after the Social Democratic Party 
jettisoned the remnants of Tannerite influence that it had the 
chance to form a stable government.
The premium placed on holding onto governmental power 
eventually convinced three of the four major political parties, 
the Agrarians, Communists, and Social Democrats, that a benevo­
lent neutrality, supported by the force of Kekkonen's person­
ality, could both satisfy the Soviet Union and put them into 
office. Only the Conservatives failed to come to this realiza­
tion, and as a result, were largely ostracized in the process of 
coalition negotiations.
The domestic political framework of Finland, as in most of 
Scandinavia, favored a preponderant role for the Social
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Democrats. Although the Social Democrats, were for much of the 
the post-War era, the largest political party, they were kept 
from fully exercising their numerical advantage because they did 
not reconcile the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line with the Tannerite 
leadership. As a result, neutrality did not always provide 
stability for Finland, which went through the crises of two 
aborted Fagerholm governments, in 1948 and 1958, and the Honka 
Front-FCMA note crisis of 1961.
The need to maintain the integrity of Finland from assimi­
lation by the Soviet Union was another factor in the development 
of Finnish neutrality. One of the hallmarks of the Paasikivi- 
Kekkonen line was the importance of personal relationships 
between the Soviet and Finnish leadership. Thus, in 1961 Finnish 
sovereignty was certainly enhanced, if not saved, by Kruschev's 
trust in Kekkonen. Neutrality, as exercised by Paasikivi and 
Kekkonen, was not a drab policy, and they understood that the 
Soviets wanted more than bureaucratic inertia committed to a 
course of perpetual neutrality. The Soviets wanted to see neu­
trality personalized and, as long as Paasikivi and Kekkonen held 
the presidency, the Soviets had their wish. The credibility of 
Finnish neutrality was used to preserve Finnish sovereignty, but 
the credibility of Finnish neutrality was preserved by Kekkonen 
and Paasikivi.
Finally, and quite obviously, the distribution of power in 
post-War Europe placed Finland within the USSR's sphere of 
influence. So if the Finns wished to maintain their chosen
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political and economic structures, both inimicable to Soviet 
communism, they had to allay Soviet security concerns. Neu­
trality became a tool with which to demilitarize their part of 
the North, and Finland convinced its fellow Scandinavians to 
tread with care. German soldiers were therefore kept out of 
maneuvers in Scandinavia, and both Denmark and Norway became 
nuclear free NATO states. Finnish neutrality was aimed at 
removing Finland as a strategic point of contention. If this 
could be accomplished, the USSR would have no need to exert its 
power, or to absorb Finland as it had Poland, Romania, Hungary, 
and Czechoslovakia. However, though distribution of power con­
strained the Finns to accommodate Soviet security interests, the 
maintenance of Finnish integration with the West, in the Nordic 
Council, with the Community, with the EFTA, and in the United 
Nations, allowed the Finns a chance to present their neutrality 
to the realities of the distribution of power. It was 
illustrated in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, a culmination of 
negotiations synonymous with the promotion of dialogue between 
the great power blocs.
* * * * *
Having demonstrated its sovereignty in the successful 
neutrality by de Valera and Fianna Fail, Ireland changed govern­
ments in 1948 and Taoiseach John A. Costello, with a Fine Gael 
coalition which included Labour and Clann na Poblachta members, 
assumed control. It was under Costello that the remaining ties 
to Great Britain were undone, and Ireland became a republic in
-47-
1949, after having repealed the External Relations Act in 1948, 
formally disassociating Ireland from the Commonwealth.120
Though Ireland was now unfettered by any formal links to the 
Commonwealth, it did not shy away from the foreign policy prece­
dent set by de Valera. Neutrality had acquired enormous popular­
ity as a symbol under which the Irish in the south had united and 
proved their sovereignty.121
In 1949 Ireland was invited to join NATO and refused in 
order to reassert its predilection for military neutrality. 
Neither Costello nor his coalition partners felt they had the 
political capital necessary for the abdication of neutrality.
The Minister for External Affairs, Sean MacBride, personally 
supported joining the Atlantic Alliance but felt he could not 
bring his party along with him.122 MacBride was a member of 
Clann na Poblachta, a party committed to the republican cause of 
reunification. It also had a domestic political agenda which 
would be harmed if money was diverted to the defense spending 
made necessary by the obligations of a defensive alliance.123 
Therefore, MacBride publicly said, "Any military alliance with or 
commitment involving a military alliance with the state that is 
responsible for the unnatural division of Ireland would be
120 Fisk, p. 469.
121 Raymond, p. 39.
122 Raymond, p. 49.
123 Raymond, p. 38-39.
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entirely repugnant and unacceptable to the Irish people."124
Privately, the Irish leadership appeared ready to initiate 
some form of defense cooperation with the West, though this would 
mean a corresponding loss of autonomy in the conduct of Irish 
foreign policy. Noting that NATO membership was politically 
untouchable, MacBride suggested to President Truman that the US 
and Ireland should consummate a bilateral defense agreement. But 
the Americans had lost interest in Irish defense cooperation and 
MacBride's proposal was ignored.125
In 1955, Liam Cosgrave, the Minister for External Affairs in 
another Fine Gael coalition, suggested that the Irish were com­
mitted to fighting the spread of communism, though not formally a 
part of NATO.126 This suggestion, along with MacBride's private 
attitude toward NATO and de Valera's assertion of a special con­
sideration to be shown for Britain's security, seemed to validate 
a US National Security Council report issued in 1955. This 
claimed that Ireland could be expected to show the West consider­
able sympathy in an East-West conflict, notwithstanding the Irish
claim to neutrality.127
1955 also marked Irish entry into the United Nations. The 
Soviet Union dropped its objection to Irish membership, as a 
Western vote, when a package deal between the Soviets and the
124 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 21.
125 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 22.
126 Fisk, p. 477.
127 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations. p. 94.
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West was worked out. Most importantly for the Irish was their 
chance to demonstrate to an international audience what was meant 
by their neutrality. The Irish policy of voting on General 
Assembly resolutions on their merits, divorcing considerations of 
East vs. West from the decision process, was initiated by 
Cosgrave and developed more thoroughly by his successor, Frank 
Aiken.128
Frank Aiken succeeded Cosgrave as Minister for External 
Affairs in 1957, when Fianna Fail once again was able to form the 
government. Aiken advocated a middle power role for Ireland.
For example, the Irish supported the right of self-determination 
in developing countries, a goal the Irish themselves had not long 
since attained. The Irish also believed in regional rather than 
East-West solutions to conflicts in developing areas like the 
Congo, the Middle East and Indochina. By fulfilling a mediatory 
role as peacekeeper within United Nations contingents, and using 
the United Nations as a forum to promote general disarmament, the 
Irish were able to promote stability while establishing their 
neutral credentials to a larger audience.
The Irish support for the Peoples Republic of China as the 
legitimate representative of China in the United Nations was 
balanced by the fact that the Irish voted with the US 75% of the
128 Garret FitzGerald, "Ireland, Europe, and America," 
Atlantic Community Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter 1981-2) p. 
485.
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time.129 The Irish were committed to judging issues on their 
merits, for example Chinese representation and disarmament, and 
this separated them from their Western neighbor's views which 
were more polarized in an East vs West fashion due to the Cold 
War. The Irish castigated the Soviet repression of Hungary in 
1956 and the concurrent Suez Canal intervention by Britain,
France and Israel. By taking the moral high ground, deploring 
the use of violence, and promoting a vision of international 
justice based on self-determination and stability, the Irish 
carved out a niche in the United Nations which promoted their own 
interest, as a small neutral state, in staying out of conflict.
An example of this was Aiken's sponsorship of a nuclear non­
proliferation treaty in the United Nations during 1958.130
The next watershed in the formulation and practice of Irish 
neutrality was the 1961 decision by Taoiseach Sean Lemass to seek 
European Economic Community membership.131 Lemass was convinced 
that, economically, Ireland had to remain integrated with the 
West. At one time, he had been prepared to compromise Irish 
neutrality for that end, as he argued in a 1959 Oxford Union
129 Ronald J. Hill & Michael O'Corcora, ''The Soviet Union in 
Irish Foreign Policy," International Affairs. Vol. 58, No. 2 
(Spring 1982) p. 467.
130 Patrick Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC,"
in National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation. 
ed. Christopher Hill (Winchester, Ma.; Allen and Unwin, 1983) p. 
144.
131 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 24.
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debate.132 Lemass said affiliation with NATO would be an 
acceptable prerequisite to Community membership if it could be 
secured in no other way.133
At this point, in the early 1960's, Lemass seemed to regard 
Ireland's economic future as more important than Irish neutrali­
ty, unlike Aiken and de Valera, men from his own party. Further­
more, Lemass also appeared to be moving away from the United 
Nations as Ireland's primary forum.
Lemass oriented Irish neutrality toward possible Community 
membership and put more emphasis on European cooperation.
Neither de Valera's hope for a neutralized Ireland nor Aiken's 
quest for a more fundamental and complete neutrality based on the 
Swedish model, would be reconciled with Lemass' pragmatic outlook 
for the economic health of the state.134
Throughout the 1960's, the Irish government continued to 
press for Community membership, while using as bait the prospect 
of some movement away from neutrality. But for all their 
rhetoric, the behavior of the Irish in the United Nations changed 
very little. Their voting record still suggested concern for 
self-determination and they continued to contribute heavily to 
United Nations peacekeeping ventures.
132 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 25.
133 Keatinge, A Place Among Nations, p. 94.
134 Trevor C. Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Com­
munity?" Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 20, No. 3,
(March 1982), p. 206.
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In 1972 a referendum in Ireland on Community membership was 
won, but although the new Irish Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, and his 
Foreign Minister, Patrick Hillery, had hinted at the possibility 
of trading a change in defense policy for admission to the Com­
munity, this did not happen and neutrality escaped unscathed.135 
The Hague Summit of 1973 paved the way for Irish admission into 
the Community. In that year the new Foreign Minister, Garret 
FitzGerald, stressed the continued likelihood of an independent 
Irish foreign policy, its affiliation with the Community not­
withstanding. Due to Ireland's historical experience and the 
Irish predilection for avoiding great power conflicts, its 
foreign policy would not be altered by Community membership, and 
Irish neutrality would continue.136
FitzGerald expressed a personal distaste for the politics of 
NATO and publicly emphasized the advantageous role Ireland could 
play by differentiating Community policy from that of NATO. In 
his view, Ireland could lend the Community a civilian image.137 
He noted that neither the Treaty of Rome nor Paris, the main Com­
munity covenants, required a military commitment, and he fought 
those who argued within the Community for further defense commit­
ments.138 The Irish asserted that defense obligations concom- 
mitant to Community membership were inappropriate. And if
135 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 27-28.
136 Salmon, p. 218.
137 FitzGerald, p. 485.
138 Salmon, p. 212.
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defense obligations were to be accepted in the future, it would 
be as a consequence of political cooperation between member 
states, not as a prerequisite to further integration.139
Ireland did much to alleviate Community concern over its 
non-participation in NATO when it participated in the CSCE as a 
Community member and not as one of the Neutral and Non-Aligned 
states. It joined the other eight Community members at the time 
in their support of detente and stability within the CSCE 
structure.140 One byproduct of the CSCE which served to further 
Irish interests was the artificial distinction made between 
security and defense. By security was meant the maintenance of 
economic survival, internal freedom, and the lowering of tensions 
and management of conflicts. By defense was meant dimensions of 
military defense such as the coordination of strategic and 
tactical planning, arms manufacture and sale, and the command 
and movement of troops.141 This distinction, though some have 
argued security is a seamless whole which includes military 
dimensions, gave the Irish enough room to participate in common 
measures adopted by the Community which furthered the interests 
of security but could not be classified as purely defense issues 
which might degenerate into the East vs. West competition the 
Irish had spent thirty years trying to avoid. An example of 
Irish cooperation on security rather than defense within the
139 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 87.
140 Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 142.
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community was their acceptance of Community funded ships to 
patrol boundaries, ostensibly a non-defense initiative meant to 
protect Ireland's fisheries.
In 1975 Garret FitzGerald assumed the Presidency of the 
European Council of Ministers and was given a chance to put into 
practice his earlier assertions concerning Ireland's natural 
sympathy for developing peoples, a product of its historical 
experience, and the dimension which Irish membership gave to the 
Community in its projection of a civilian entity apart from 
NATO.142
Ireland had not altered its United Nations voting pattern as 
a result of Community membership, and combined with the Belgians, 
Dutch and Danes, it presented a progressive voice in both the 
United Nations and the Community. They had refused to partici­
pate in an earlier Community sponsored force in the Sinai on the 
grounds the United Nations was the proper organization to act as 
a mediator because it was not controlled by any one power bloc 
consistently, and had established a solid peacekeeping record in 
Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Ireland's neutrality 
also enabled it to supply peacekeeping forces in both Cyprus and 
the Sinai, conflicts which had provoked considerable disunity 
among NATO members.143 In fact, the Irish supplied so many 
peacekeeping troops to the Sinai that some had to be called home 
after a rash of bombings in Monaghan and Dublin required their
142 Keatinge, "Ireland: Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 137.
143 Salmon, pp. 225-226.
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presence in Ireland.144
FitzGerald, during his term as the President of the European 
Council of Ministers, from January to June of 1975, successfully 
negotiated the Euro-African dialogue at Lome, the talks being 
facilitated, according to some, by Ireland's neutrality, its 
advocacy of development in the Third World, and its history as 
part of the British empire. It was also FitzGerald who was 
called upon to negotiate with the post-revolutionary leaders of 
Portugal in that same year, again because of Ireland's neutral 
stance.145
Ireland also took tentative steps in the early 1970's to 
improve its relationships with communist Europe, which had been 
distant due, in large part, to the Irish Catholic antipathy to 
communism in general.146 There were no diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union until 1973. Since 1946, when the Soviets 
vetoed Ireland's admission to the United Nations, relations 
between the Soviet Union and Ireland were rudimentary at best. 
They did not interact culturally, politically, economically, 
militarily, or otherwise to any great degree, if at all. With 
the gradual reorientation of Irish policy toward the European 
theatre and Community membership, the Irish interest in contact 
with the East also began to grow.
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In the early seventies, Patrick Hillery, the Foreign
Minister, demonstrated an ability to separate such issues as
\
trade and commerce from Ireland's natural concern for freedom and 
self-determination in Eastern Europe, and the general antics of 
Soviet imperialism which had strained relations between the 
countries.147 In 1973, Garret FitzGerald completed Hillery's 
initiative and opened full diplomatic relations between the 
Soviet Union and Ireland. The carrot of potentially vast markets 
for Irish goods gave him the strength to overcome domestic 
opposition to establishing relations with the USSR. He success­
fully extended the policy of Lemass and Lynch, which gave 
economic benefits an equal weight with moral considerations in 
Irish foreign policy.148
Unlike the Finnish party spectrum, which had only belatedly 
come to accept the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line of neutrality, there 
was a relative consensus among Irish politicians, that personal 
feelings aside, military neutrality had to be maintained. As 
such, governments were not made or unmade on the issue of neu­
trality. The policy had enormous symbolic value as a unifying 
force and a manifestation of Irish independence.
Only by the 1960s, with the advent of an economic, and 
therefore European, orientation in Irish foreign policy, did 
neutrality seem threatened by Community membership, which
147 Hill, p. 261.
148 Hill, p. 261.
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demanded some political solidarity on the part of member states. 
But, as the Finns would not abandon their commitment to free 
enterprise and an open form of government because of the FCMA, 
neither would Ireland sacrifice its concern for distributive 
justice and self-determination, which was a manifestation of 
Ireland's sovereignty and was made practical by neutrality, 
because of Community membership.
Irish peacekeeping contributions in the United Nations, like 
the Finnish response, were attempts to assert their state 
sovereignty and gain wider acceptance for their neutrality.
Also, the Irish were able to assert their independence through 
their voting record, which was labeled "progressive" and not 
clearly aligned to either of the major power blocs. This con­
trasted with the Finnish voting pattern in the United Nations in 
which the Finns quite glaringly refrained from citicising the 
USSR's forays into Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Finns could 
assert their independence through United Nations mediatory 
efforts, but would endanger their autonomy by criticising Soviet 
repression.
The distribution of power mattered less in constraining 
Irish foreign policy in the post-War period than it did during 
the conflict. Great Britain fell in political and military 
stature and was no longer a Superpower as it had been. Though 
British military power was not likely to be exercised as a threat 
to Ireland, the British economy was the lifeblood of the Irish 
economy and, if they so chose, the British could exert
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considerable economic power upon the Irish. Thus it was 
essential for the Irish to follow the British into the Community, 
lest they be economically crippled. Just the opposite occurred 
in Finland. Their economy could have been integrated wholly into 
the West, but a move in that direction would have brought a 
Soviet response. The Soviets, unlike the British, had shown a 
willingness to use force in repressing neighboring countries 
during the post-War era and the Finns did not want to be in that 
number. The decision by the Finnish government to seek 
concurrent agreement with the communist states when they sought 
Community affiliation was purely obeisance to Soviet power.
The distribution of power constrained the Irish economi­
cally. Unlike Sweden they could not practice both an economic 
neutrality and a military neutrality. The Finns simply had no 
choice but to develop their economy to the point that economic 
parity in their relations with East and West was observed. While 
the activism of the Irish was not constrained by concerns of 
Western power, the Finns were constrained by the presence of 
Soviet power and they tempered their neutral stance to this fact.
Chapter 3 
"The Current Challenge"
In 1976 Leo Tindemans, the Belgian foreign minister, issued 
a report which suggested that steps toward the formation of an 
eventual European Union ought to include issues of defense.149 
This was one of the first papers within a Community context which 
seemed to threaten Irish neutrality, if only theoretically at the 
moment, because European Union remains a pipedream. The Irish 
response to Tindeman's proposal was negative. Ireland's stance 
was that further European integration must precede defense 
cooperation, and part of the integration process must be the 
lessening of the disparity in wealth among Community members.
Even were rough economic parity to occur among Community members, 
an Irish commitment on defense would still be judged on its 
merits, with no guarantee of a positive response.150
Of course, Ireland would not seem strategically important to 
Community defense. NATO has bases to the north of Ireland in 
Greenland and Norway, and to the south in the Portuguese Azores, 
which would render Ireland redundant as a link to the US.151 
Though the airports of Shannon and Dublin could prove useful, the 
Continent has bigger and better facilities that would be more 
proximate to a conflict, should one occur.
In 1981 the spectre of defense commitments within the 
Community was again raised by the Genscher-Colombo report, the
149 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 29.
150 Keatinge, "Neutrality Inside EPC," p. 140.
151 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 63-64.
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product of the German and Italian foreign ministers.152 
Genscher-Colombo was regarded with suspicion in Ireland because 
it suggested that future European integration ought to include 
defense cooperation. This raised the question of a neutral's 
place in a future Community modified by Genscher-Colombo.
A response to Genscher-Colombo was produced on 13 May 1981 
during a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The President of 
the Council, British Foreign Secretary Carrington, in a personal 
statement, stressed that neither the London Report nor the 
Genscher-Colombo proposal were meant to embarrass the Irish. 
Instead, the two reports were meant to emphasize a flexible and 
pragmatic approach to common security issues confronting 
Community members.153
Beyond the theoretical consequences the two proposals might 
have to Ireland and the practice of its foreign policy, it was 
evident that the Irish were not constrained in their positions on 
contentious international issues by the need for a European con­
sensus, nor were they being pressured to conform. They criti­
cised the Camp David Accord, for example, which was widely 
applauded in the rest of the Community, because it failed to 
resolve the Palestinian homeland question or include the rest of 
the Arab world.154 They called for an end to apartheid before 
the rest of the Community, and pressed for sanctions against
152 Keatinge, "Neutrality inside EPC," p. 149.
153 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, pp. 89-90.
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South Africa and Namibia. This initiative was vetoed by both 
Britain and France in the UN Security Council.155
European integration or no, the Irish still adhered to their 
policy of judging each case on its merits, which might or might 
not bring it into line with the more powerful members of the 
Community. For example, they condemned the Soviet Union for its 
actions in Afghanistan in 1980, and condemned the criminal action 
of hostage-taking in the US Embassy in Tehran. In all these 
cases, the overriding Irish concern was for self-determination 
and justice.156 Irish neutrality certainly did not seem 
threatened by Ireland's membership in the Community, judging from 
its response to current issues. And talk of further European 
integration did not interfere with Irish neutrality, if one can 
judge by the practice of Irish foreign policy.
Ireland's performance in international relations did not 
raise doubts about its commitment to neutrality and it was clear 
that, in the domestic political arena, neutrality was again a 
prized mantle. In 1980, Taoiseach Haughey raised the possibility 
of changes in Irish defense policy as a quid pro quo for British 
concessions on the border question, and in 1981, the Dail debated 
the question of whether neutrality should or should not be the 
basis of Irish foreign policy.157 The Irish declined to embrace 
neutrality formally, but reaffirmed the policies which had guided
155 Keatinge, "Neutrality inside EPC," p. 144.
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Irish policymakers in the past.158
The 1981 change of government in Ireland from Fianna Fail to 
Fine Gael also provoked a debate on neutrality. The former mini­
ster, Brian Lenihan, accused the incoming Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Dr. James Dooge, of being ready to sacrifice neutrality 
for the sake of European integration. Dooge exchanged recrimi­
nations, with the help of his Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald, who 
noted that Lenihan had done an admirable job of confusing the 
distinction between security and defense during an EEC meeting 
at Venlo.159 Ironically, the uproar at the mere suggestion that 
either party, Fianna Fail or Fine Gael, might be on the path to 
abandoning neutrality, underlined the political importance of the 
concept. Both parties wanted to assume the title of neutrality's 
protector.
Dooge, in an effort to dispel doubts over his steadfastness 
to neutrality, reminded the Community that political cooperation 
within the Community would have to be delineated from NATO 
policy. He also directed his aides not to participate in Com­
munity meetings which raised defense questions, and forbade Irish 
signatures on Community communiques which concerned defense 
issues.160
Still, separating valid Community security issues from de­
fense issues was a difficult task. The Irish had been part of a
158 Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Community?," p. 205.
159 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 88.
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solid Community front at the CSCE in Helsinki and its subsequent 
review meetings. Moreover, the Irish had participated as a 
Community member not as a neutral or non-aligned nation, as did 
the other Continental neutrals who are not members of the 
Community.161 The Irish also accepted Community funding of heli­
copters, frigates and corvettes to patrol their coastal 
waters.162 Patrolling the coastal waters of Ireland with Com­
munity funded vessels was viewed as security, rather than 
defense, cooperation on the grounds that Ireland was attempting 
to protect the economic integrity of her waters and the vessels 
had few offensive capabilities.
While the argument over security vs. defense issues prompted 
both Fianna Fail and Fine Gael to reassert their commitments to 
military neutrality, the Irish Labour party went even further. 
Labour's support of neutrality may be said to have historical 
roots older than those of either Fianna Fail or Fine Gael. James 
Connelly's opposition to Irish participation in World War I, and 
the 1919 International Labour Conference espousal of neutrality, 
demonstrate these roots.163 Subsequently, the party adopted a 
fundamental, or ordinary neutrality, as observed by the 
Continental neutrals, as part of its manifesto in March 1981, and 
it pledged to work neutrality into the Irish Constitution if the
161 Salmon, "Ireland: A Neutral in the Community?," p. 222.
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chance presented itself.164 A small chance did occur with 
Labour's participation in the Fine Gael coalition formed in 1981, 
but the new Minister of Defense, Paddy Cooney considered funda­
mental neutrality one of Labour's "loonier shrines" and declined 
to embrace the idea.165
However, the Irish continued to practice the same type of 
neutral, mediatory role in the United Nations as they had before 
their membership in the Community. From 1979-83, they partici­
pated in United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon, while 
declining participation in efforts by Community member states to 
duplicate such action. Just as the Irish had earlier demon­
strated in their opposition to Community forces in the Sinai, 
they were committed to the United Nations as the proper agency to 
undertake security measures because the United Nations was not 
tainted with the stigma of a specific power bloc.
The Irish found themselves in the unaccustomed place of a 
seat on the UN Security Council from 1981-82. By coincidence, it 
was in this period that the Falklands crisis erupted. However, 
the Falklands crisis, lasting from April to June 1982, proved how 
valuable neutrality was as a state value, and how muddled 
neutrality could be as a state policy.166
The initial Irish response to the seizure of the Falklands 
by Argentina was to back UN resolution 502 condemning Argentine
164 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 102.
165 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 105.
166 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 105.
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aggression. However, Ireland's UN Ambassador, Dorr, felt there 
still existed some ambiguity as to the legal title to the 
Falklands.167 Argentina was wrong to use force but its legal 
argument might have some validity.
The British response to the seizure of the islands was 
military, represented by an armada. After a naval confrontation 
resulted in the sinking of the Argentine battleship, General 
Belgrano, Ireland was placed in a difficult situation. During 
the conflict, the Irish had participated in the British sponsored 
Community boycott of Argentina, but the sinking of the Belgrano 
prompted the Haughey government to change direction and declare 
that they would not be bound to observe Community sanctions, 
because of Ireland's traditional policy of neutrality.168
While Haughey did repudiate Defense Minister Paddy Power's 
assertion that the British were the aggressors, his action was 
aimed at putting pressure on Britain by breaking Community ranks. 
The Italians followed the Irish in protest, and on 4 May 1982, 
these two countries supported a motion to end Community economic 
sanctions against Argentina.169 Though this gambit failed, the 
British could hardly have been pleased by this show of Community 
non-solidarity.
Haughey continued to defend his position from attacks by
167 MacQueen, p. 42.
168 Fisk, p. 478.
169 MacQueen, p. 46.
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opposition leader FitzGerald, who claimed that Haughey's embrace 
of neutrality in the crisis was belated, and by the British, who 
stressed the obligations of Community membership and the impor­
tance of solidarity.170
Both Taoiseach Haughey and Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Gerry Collins, began stressing the importance of the U.N. in 
resolving issues of this sort. Of course, any U.N. role in the 
crisis would guarantee a large measure of Irish participation by 
dint of their seat on the Security Council.171 Haughey asserted
in the Irish Times on 7 May 1982, "Our options are much more
limited than anyone elses (in the EEC). As a neutral nation that 
has always refrained from military alliances of any kind, we have 
to take a very clear view of any action, economic or otherwise, 
that would appear supportive of military action. Sanctions 
complementing military action are not acceptable to us as a 
neutral country.172 However, as FitzGerald pointed out, Haughey 
had participated fully in the Community sanctions for a time and 
was now using his noncompliance with sanctions to spur British 
movement on agricultural subsidies within the Community which 
would benefit Ireland.173 If this was true, Haughey's remark in 
the Irish Times was not very accurate.
Nonetheless, the Irish and Italians continued to support
170 MacQueen, p. 48.
171 MacQueen, p. 43.
172 MacQueen, p. 47.
173 MacQueen, p. 47.
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anti-renewal measures within the Community until 17 May 1982.
The Irish then ceased participating in the Community debates and 
focused solely on efforts in the U.N. On 21 May 1982, the day 
the British forces landed on San Carlos to regain possession of 
the Falklands, UN Ambassador Dorr called for the cessation of 
hostilities and the deployment of a UN observer force to prevent 
the possibility of the conflict becoming much larger. Pre­
dictably, this idea was vetoed by both Britain and France in the 
UN Security Council.174
Irish behavior in the crisis did not provoke the Haughey 
government into leaving the Community. The economic advantages 
of membership outweighed any other considerations, but the Irish 
had shown that their independence in foreign policy was not 
encumbered by Community membership. Thus, while Ireland's 
neutrality might prove nettlesome to, it would not be threatened 
by, the Community.
Therefore, in Ireland neutrality declined as a political 
issue, although the structure of Irish neutrality was debated. 
For example, a neutral must be able to defend itself and should 
have an adequate defense force for this purpose. Recently, the 
Irish had been spending less on defense, on a per capita basis, 
than any other neutral or NATO country in Europe, including such 
minimal spenders as Portugal, Greece and Switzerland.175
174 MacQueen, p. 51.
175 Salmon, "The Changing Nature of Irish Defense Policy," 
p. 467.
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In 1982, UN Ambassador Dorr called for a worldwide reduction in 
conventional forces, arguing that Ireland's defense forces were 
already at a level acceptable to a disarmed world, but in 1983, 
Fine Gael Minister of Defense, Paddy Cooney, suggested that 
Ireland could confidently rely on NATO if it were attacked by 
forces hostile to the West.176,177
A firm commitment to military neutrality was consistent with 
a weak army, because of Ireland's relatively unimportant 
strategic position. In an age of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, Great Britain was no longer a bulwark of the West and 
this reduced the likelihood that Ireland would be used as a base 
of attack. Furthermore, missile technology has made conventional 
perceptions of territorial transgression of a neutral's integrity 
somewhat obsolete.
Ireland's current defense forces can best be classified as a 
gendarmie.178 It has almost no offensive capability. Its main 
roles are serving in UN peacekeeping operations and controlling 
domestic political terrorism, for example, by patrolling the 
border with Northern Ireland. It has no jet fighters or bombers 
and its air force is largely restricted to prop driven recon­
naissance and ground support planes.179 The helicopters, fri­
gates and corvettes of the navy are used for patrolling Ireland's
176 Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 119.
177 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 73.
178 Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 69.
179 Keatinge, A Singular Stance, p. 68.
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200 mile coastal waters. There is little armour or anti-aircraft 
capability. Thus Ireland is constrained by its peculiar armed 
forces to a military neutrality in which its fate is left up to 
Western benevolence and its own strategic insignificance.
Though Ireland may not possess the capability to repel an 
aggressor, inroads or weaknesses in the political attractiveness 
of neutrality have not been apparent. The New Ireland Forum of 
30 May 1983 brought agreement between Dick Spring of Labour, 
Charles Haughey of Fianna Fail, and Garret FitzGerald of Fine 
Gael, that a united Ireland would remain neutral.180
In 1987, the Single European Act, a modification of 
Genscher-Colombo which omitted references to NATO or military 
security, was confirmed in a referendum by the Irish 
electorate.181 Thus, Ireland became the last of the twelve 
European Economic Community member states to accept a package of 
political and economic measures which give concreteness to the 
"Solemn Declaration on European Union" referred to by the Act. 
Though this strengthens the possibilities for further political 
and economic coordination within the Community, the doubts of 
1981 about the viability of neutrality were largely absent in 
Ireland. The Irish now presented a united front on the non­
negotiability of Ireland's neutrality. The policy was no longer 
merely a useful expedient, subject to future review. It was 
firmly established policy.
180 Keatinge. A Singular Stance, p. 83.
181 The Christian Science Monitor. 28 May 1987, p. 2.
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In the analysis of the factors of constraint on Irish 
neutrality from the mid-1970's to the present, the most important 
factor has been the popularity of neutrality in Irish domestic 
politics. The Dail debates on Professor Dooge's appointment as 
foreign minister, and the debates dealing with Haughey's handling 
of the Falkland*s crisis, demonstrated how powerful a force neu­
trality had become politically. Neither Fianna Fail nor Fine 
Gael was willing to be characterized as less than rock solid in 
its support of a militarily neutral Ireland. The exact practice 
or consistency of Irish neutrality could be questioned. The Fine 
Gael Minister of Defense, Paddy Power, and Fianna Fail Taoiseach, 
Charles Haughey, both made statements which seemed to waver on 
this point, but when pressed, neither of the two largest parties 
would lessen its hold on neutrality as a state symbol. It had 
become too important politically.
The domestic political framework was solidifying in support 
of some type of non-negotiable neutrality. No longer did 
politicians make remarks like Lemass did in the 1960*s, hinting 
at joining NATO in return for entrance into the Community, or as 
a quid pro quo for the reunification of the island. The Irish 
were now in the Community and their neutrality was not seriously 
questioned by other Community members. The New Ireland Forum 
also brought agreement among the leaders of the South that an 
eventually united Ireland would, and should, remain neutral.
If anything, the most contentious force in the domestic
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political debate was the Irish Labour Party*s attachment to a 
more rigorous neutrality than that embraced by Fianna Fail or 
Fine Gael. While this may cause some difficulty for future Fine 
Gael-Labour coalitions, it certainly will do nothing but 
strengthen the tendency of the Irish political leadership to 
identify with neutrality. The population, in fact, seemed not at 
all threatened by suggestions that the Single European Act might 
put Ireland*s neutrality at risk. They endorsed the referendum 
and brought Ireland into line with the rest of the Community.
Only a populace solidly attached to neutrality would have taken 
this step, one that theoretically limits the scope of Irish 
neutrality by providing for further European coordination.
The need to assert Irish sovereignty is linked to the 
prospects of further European integration. The Irish could join 
the Community and vote for further European integration because 
neither of these steps immediately threatened the use of neu­
trality as a symbol of Irish independence. Indeed, Ireland has 
broken with the Community ranks in the boycott of Argentina, has 
supported the right of the Palestinians to a homeland, has sup­
ported sanctions against Namibia and South Africa, and has gen- 
nerally voted a progressive line in the UN with regard to self- 
determination and economic development in the Third World. The 
Irish continue to formulate answers to questions based on the 
merits of each case, as they see them. By remaining neutral, they 
do not have to temper their views to one power bloc or the other.
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The distribution of power, the last factor to consider, had 
not radically changed during the previous twenty five years. The 
Irish were still situated in a British and American lake and are 
still heavily integrated into the British economy. They have 
felt so integrated into the Western zone of influence that they 
have largely abandoned the thought of a credible military 
defense. Likewise, they are firmly indebted to the West in 
matters of trade and economic survival. If not for Great 
Britain and the rest of the Community, the Irish economy would be 
even weaker than it is today. As a result, Ireland's neutrality 
is benevolent to the West, and practically speaking, it is 
constrained by the balance of power to this benevolence. Domestic 
politics and maintenance of sovereignty have constrained the 
Irish to a neutral course, but the distribution of power directs 
this neutrality toward the West.
Ireland has used this orientation to facilitate dialogue 
between the Western powers and parts of the world not normally 
receptive to the West. Thus, when the Community needed a 
negotiator with the post-revolutionary Portuguese leadership, or 
the Arab countries, it was Ireland which served this function.
So, while the distribution of power suggests that the Irish 
should join the Western alliance, this need not occur as long as 
Irish neutrality is directed toward fulfilling needs seen as non­
threatening and beneficial to the West.
* * * * *
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Du ring the 1970s, Finland*s use of neutrality to promote an 
image of accommodating both East and West had reached its maximum 
effort. The CSCE included the US and Canada only because the 
Finns convinced the USSR that a conference without the two North 
American nations would lessen the chances that the CSCE would be 
viewed as contributing to detente.182 The Soviet-Finnish Treaty 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) was 
renewed, but the Finns refrained from criticizing the US for its 
actions in Vietnam. In 1973 the two Germanies were simultaneous­
ly recognized by Finland, promoting diplomatic links among the 
three states, other than trade missions, for the first time since 
World War II.183 In exchange for recognition, both East and West 
Germany promised to respect Finnish neutrality and gave the Finns 
pledges of nonaggression.184
While Kekkonen occupied the presidency, the government was 
composed of varying Center-Left coalitions which largely left 
foreign policy in the president's hands. Kekkonen continued to 
commit forces to UN efforts, with Finns in Cyprus until 1977 and 
in Lebanon starting in 1979. He also continued to use the UN as 
a forum for advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons, an issue 
he raised extensively in 1978.18^
182 Faloon, p. 8.
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184 Faloon, p. 8.
185 Vayrynen, p. 148.
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The late 1970s and early 1980s ended the period of detente 
between the Superpowers, but Kekkonen continued to refrain from 
committing himself to either side in East-West conflict. Com­
munist aggression in Kampuchea in 1979, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980, and the declaration of martial law in Poland 
did not illicit a Finnish response. However, the invasion of the 
US embassy in Tehran and the subsequent hostage taking, not East- 
West issues, did provoke condemnation by Kekkonen.186 The Finns 
also took no sides by participating in both the 1980 Olympics in 
Moscow and the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.
In 1981-2 a power struggle took place in Finland to deter­
mine the successor to President Kekkonen. The electoral college 
was a reflection of party strength and it was assumed that, as 
the largest part, the Social Democrats could virtually pick the 
next president at a party caucus. But they could not unify for 
this event and one faction, allied with the Agrarians and the 
Communists, received the important endorsement of President 
Kekkonen. The Social Democrat candidate favoured by Kekkonen, 
and subsequently elected by the electoral college, was Mauno 
Koivisto, one of the Social Democrats opposed to the Tannerites 
and the Honka front in 1961. In 1966 he was in the cabinet of 
the first, Soviet endorsed, Social Democratic government of 
Finland. In 1968 he became Prime Minister, and his experience
186 Jaako Blomberg, "Finlandfs Policy of Neutrality in Times 
of Detente and Tension," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign 
Policy (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1985) p. 3.
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also included a term on the board of governors of the Bank of 
Finland.187
Koivisto would finally enable a representative of the 
largest party to serve in the highest office. He was the choice 
of Kekkonen and was known and trusted by Moscow. He was well 
prepared, having played a number of roles in different Finnish 
coalitions, and was a vocal supporter of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen 
line that had facilitated Finland*s continued existence as a 
sovereign state.
Early in Koivisto*s tenure, however, it became apparent that 
the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was undergoing some modification. In 
1984, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Paavo Vayrynen, asserted that 
the line was no longer to be interpreted as treating both the 
East and the West in a symmetrical fashion. Vayrynen was aware 
that Finland*s propinquity to the Soviet Union meant that, if the 
Soviets wished, Finland*s sovereignty could be endangered. He 
was also aware that the new Social Democratic leadership had not 
accumulated the trust that the Kremlin had for Kekkonen. Because 
of strategic reality and the infancy of their tenure, therefore, 
Vayrynen believed the Social Democratic government would have to 
give the Soviet Union more sympathetic consideration, than had 
their predecessor.188
187 Lauri Haataja, "The President’s Image and His 
Selection," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy. 
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Some examples of criticism aimed at the West by Finland 
demonstrate this point. Israel was severely rebuked by Finland 
for its invasion of Lebanon and the idea of a Palestinian 
homeland was supported. The US intervention in Grenada during 
the collapse of the Bishop regime and the NEW JEWEL movement also 
brought Finnish condemnation. Finally, Reagan*s aggressive 
tactics against the Sandinistas have brought Finnish 
displeasure.189
In 1983, the same year that the US intervention in Grenada 
was condemned in Helsinki, the Finns extended the terra of the 
FCMA, echoing the process of 1955 and 1970.190 While the FCMA 
reduced tensions to Finland's east, an attempt by Koivisto and 
Vayrynen to line up support for a Nordic Nuclear Free Weapons 
Zone (NFWZ) failed. Finland's accommodation of the Soviet 
Union's security interests was not shared by the rest of 
Scandinavia. For example, the deployment of cruise missiles and 
Pershing IIs to counter the Soviet INF buildup was not criticized 
in Scandinavia, except by Finland.191 The Swedes had been vexed 
by the outstanding matter of Soviet submarines, in all likelihood 
carrying nuclear weapons, stranding themselves in Swedish waters. 
Norway and Denmark, as signatories of NATO, simply could not
189 Blomberg, p. 3.
190 "Chronology of Events," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish 
Foreign Policy (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1986)
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formalize their adherence to the NFWZ, and there existed in the 
two countries a great deal more scepticism regarding Soviet 
motives than there was in Finland.192 Nonetheless, Foreign 
Minister Vayrynen continued to press the idea. As recently as 
1985, at the review meeting of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 
Geneva, he continued to assert the practicality and usefulness of 
nuclear free regions in the promotion of non-proliferation and 
disarmament. He also used this forum to call for more progress 
in the US-USSR INF negotiations.193
1985 was also the year during which the Finns had a hostage 
crisis of their own in the Middle East. They had previously 
condemned the Israeli bombardment of PLO headquarters in Tunis, 
as well as the Israeli presence in Lebanon generally and now 
found themselves at the mercy of Israeli proxies. The South 
Lebanese Army took hostage twenty four Finnish soldiers serving 
with the UN.194 The soldiers were eventually returned, with 
Israeli assistance, and the Finnish government kept lines open in 
Jerusalem throughout the matter. These communication links with 
the Israeli leadership would again prove valuable in 1987, during
192 "Chronology of Events," in 1984 Yearbook of Finnish 
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a Soviet visit to Jerusalem.195 The Soviet Union, which had 
broken ties with Israel, was forced to use the good offices of 
Finland. In effect, the Soviets operated out of the Finnish 
embassy.
During Koivisto's presidency there has also been an in­
creased attempt to further integrate Soviet and Finnish economic 
needs. The level of Finnish-Soviet trade had decreased somewhat 
late in Kekkonen's final term. The Finns had actively partici­
pated in EFTA-EEC agreements in 1977 at Vienna, and in 1984 in 
Luxembourg.196 The levels of Finnish trade directed toward the 
East and the West were not symmetrical. The bulk of Finnish 
trade was, and still is, with Western nations.197 However, at 
the start of a new five year agreement in 1986 with the Soviet 
Union, which was intended to increase Finnish-Soviet trade, the 
Finnish leadership noted that bilateral trade between the Soviet 
Union and Finland was expanding. From 1976-80, the Soviet Union 
accounted for 18.6% of Finnish trade. That figure rose to 23.4% 
in the years of 1981-5. But Finnish trade with NATO signatories 
still accounted for over 50% of Finland's trade income.198 The 
attempt to develop parity in trade with both East and West
195 The Associated Press, in The Daily Press, Newport News, 
Virginia, 21 July 1987, p. 8.
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is clearly not practical, but Finland aims to have a healthy 
trade with both power blocs so that the prosperity of its Western 
oriented economy is realized without provoking Soviet anxieties.
Trade has been used, therefore, to muffle Soviet concerns 
about Finland becoming too deeply integrated with the West. The 
Finns and the Soviets worked together, for example, to develop 
nuclear power plants in Finland. In 1985 the Finns signed a gas 
supply agreement with the Soviet Union which calls for joint 
development of the pipeline to the Soviet source and will supply 
Finland's energy needs through 2008.199 The Finns also continued 
to buy the main Soviet battle tank for their armed forces, the 
T—72. Developing trade in sensitive items such as nuclear power 
and the procurement of weapons ensures that trade links are 
assured in the future. Furthermore, the Joint Finnish-Soviet 
Commission for Economic cooperation acts as an offshoot of the 
FCMA to forestall Soviet fears of a Western economic takeover in 
Finland by promoting economic links and joint projects between 
Finland and the USSR.200 Finnish cooperation with the Soviets in 
the procurement of supplies for its army, development of nuclear 
power, and the pipeline project were coordinated by this com­
mission. A recient project of the commission foresees the
199 "Chronology of Events," in 1985 Yearbook of Finnish 
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development of a $350 million dollar coal plant in 
Phillipines.201 Such ventures garner dividends for both 
parties. The Soviets acquire much needed Western currency and 
the Finns strengthen their credibility in the Kremlin.
The emphasis placed on trade between the Soviet Union and 
Finland appears to have been strengthened during the Koivisto 
presidency, and this would seem to be a corrolary of the Vayrynen 
assertion that Finland's neutrality is nonsymmetrical.
To review the factors influencing Finnish neutrality during 
this time period, the starting point will be the tug and pull of 
domestic politics. For the first time since 1956, Finland had a 
new man in the presidency. Koivisto was selected because he was 
a Social Democrat who appealed to both the Communists and the 
Agrarians. This was due to his pledge to continue the Paasikivi- 
Kekkonen line and his non-Tannerite past. But with mainly Social 
Democratic advisors, the emphasis on detachment from East-West 
competition that Kekkonen initiated was dropped. And it was 
perhaps the need the Social Democrats felt to develop Soviet 
trust in the Koivisto presidency that led to the more accommo­
dating pose sculpted by Koivisto and Vayrynen.
The loss of Kekkonen meant that the forces of domestic 
politics would have less power to constrain Finnish neutrality. 
The last years of Kekkonen's presidency were not politically
201 Richard J. Kessler, "Are the Soviets Sneaking up on the 
Phillipines?" in the Washington Post. 26 July 1987, p. Bl.
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content ious , as his 80% reelection figure in 1980 would indicate, 
but his seat above the political fray also enabled him to formu­
late a foreign policy which was less accommodating to the Soviet 
Union. He had developed the personal trust of the Kremlin, and 
as a result, his initiatives did not become political issues in 
Finland. The election of Koivisto merely signalled a return to 
the days of the earlier Paasikivi and Kekkonen presidencies that 
were more accommodating toward Soviet interests than was the 
later portion of Kekkonen1s tenure.
The need to maintain sovereignty and state integrity con­
strained Finland's brand of neutrality less than in earlier 
periods. The long stay in office by Kekkonen had dispelled 
Soviet doubts over Finnish intentions, and Soviet absorption of 
Finland was now out of the question. The main force of state 
sovereignty, and the assertion of that sovereignty, was expressed 
in Finland's role as a mediator. By developing Helsinki's image 
as a neutral site in which East-West conferences could be held, 
dialogue promoted and treaties signed, Finland's neutral image 
gained credibility and the state found a secure outlet for the 
expression of its sovereignty.
Finally, the distribution of power continued to be the 
dominant consideration in the practice of Finnish neutrality.
The Finns could not integrate too closely into the West for fear 
of provoking Soviet paranoia. Instead the Finns found that, even 
in foreign trade, they would have to adapt economic priorities to 
fit their attempt to stay out of great power competition. The
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natural orientation of Finland's economic system favoured trade 
with the West. The proximity of the USSR and the Soviet need for 
Western technology, which was obtainable through Finland, 
promoted trade to the East. By exchanging manufactured goods for 
Soviet raw materials such as gas and oil, the Finns achieved the 
most balanced East-West trade portfolio in Europe.
Likewise the Soviet military presence promoted a certain 
blindness in Finnish neutrality. The Finns simply did not act as 
if they saw Soviet power being exerted in Afghanistan, or 
indirectly in Poland, and their silence on these matters was the 
result. On the otherhand, the silence which had greeted Western 
imperialism in Kekkonen's last years was also over. The West, 
specifically the US, was chastised for its involvement in the 
Caribbean, and Central America, and for its intransigence in the 
US—USSR INF talks.
* Conclusions *
The historical review of Finnish and Irish neutrality is now 
complete and it is necessary to compare the forces of constraint 
which moulded Irish and Finnish neutrality, bringing out the 
similarities and explaining the contrasts. For as the con­
straints differed in intensity, so did the development of the two 
neutralities.
Presently, in both Ireland and Finland, there is a consensus 
among the political parties that, for political purposes, neu­
trality is too valuable a policy to neglect. But in both coun­
tries, there exists disagreement over the type of neutrality that 
should be practiced, making the formulation of neutrality a some­
what contentious issue at election time.
In Ireland, the Labour Party is the strongest proponent of a 
complete or fundamental neutrality. This is, Labour proposes to 
institutionalize neutrality by introducing an amendment to the 
constitution which stipulates that Ireland be a neutral country, 
politically, militarily and in all other forms of international 
intercourse. While this type of arrangement has proved feasible 
on the Continent, for example the Swiss are constitutionally 
bound to neutrality, it has not moved much beyond the circle of 
Labour proponents in Ireland. But Labour is the third largest 
party in Ireland and its importance as a possible coalition 
partner makes it difficult to imagine any government advancing a 
policy which would lead to a reduction in scope of the military 
neutrality already in place.
The Fianna Fail and Fine Gael parties espouse a military
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neutrality, the principles of which were developed by Eamon de 
Valera in World War II. Though officials in Fine Gael and Fianna 
Fail have alluded to Ireland's natural affinity for the West, and 
Ireland's concomitant responsibility to the Western powers if 
they are attacked by the Soviet bloc, neither party has seriously 
considered joining NATO. There is a recognition that military 
neutrality is too valuable a political weapon not to be used, and 
as shown during the Falkland's crisis, each major party will, if 
pushed, claim to be more neutral than the other.
In Finland there is also a recognition that neutrality is 
immensely popular with the public, and is therefore not to be 
abandoned by any party which wishes to remain in office. The 
Agrarian party, whose members have included Kekkonen and 
Paasikivi, is the original architect of what is known as the 
Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This is the policy of declaring Finland 
neutral, accommodating Soviet security interests, attempting to 
de-militarize Scandinavia, and developing Finland's role as a 
mediator.
The second largest party, the Communists, favor a stronger 
link to the Soviet Union than is represented by the Paasikivi- 
Kekkonen line, but have been willing to compromise party 
principle to serve in Center-Left coalitions. However, willing­
ness to compromise party principles has come late to the largest 
party, the Social Democrats. For much of the post-War period, 
this party was not politically successful. It had trouble, for 
example, forming stable governments in the Finnish parliament
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because of its non-acceptance of a corollary to the Paasikivi- 
Kekkonen line. Because Soviet security interests must be taken 
into account in formulating Finnish foreign policy, it is 
essential that the leaders of Finland have some credibility in 
the Kremlin. This was recognized by Paasikivi and Kekkonen, but 
the Tannerite leadership of the Social Democrats lacked this 
credibility, and as a result Social Democratic governments led by 
Fagerholm in 1948 and 1958, and the 1961 Honka front, were 
ultimately failures. Only after the Social Democrats embraced 
the "personal corollary" of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was 
stability introduced into Finnish neutrality, the product of 
Soviet trust, and was political success granted to the Social 
Democrats.
The need to maintain and assert state sovereignty as a cause 
of neutrality is evident in both Ireland and Finland. In 
Ireland, neutrality was practiced by de Valera in World War II 
for just such a purpose. He need to provide a working policy 
behind which the population would unite, and at the same time 
distance himself from Great Britain. Neutrality was, and is, a 
means to delineate Irish independence from the United Kingdom.
Unlike Ireland, Finland was unable to assert complete state 
sovereignty through neutrality until the Soviet evacuation of 
Porkalla in 1956. Though Finland's assertion of state 
sovereignty has been of a shorter tenure than Ireland's neu­
trality has played just as big a role in its independence from 
the Soviet Union. Finland resisted attempts by the Soviets to be
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dr awn into the communist orbit and was the only country to say no 
when asked to join the Warsaw Pact.
In both Finland and Ireland, the declaration and practice of 
neutrality has facilitated independence, but the same policy has 
also facilitated mediatory actions which are embraced by the 
political framework, and are used to establish an international 
identity and gain credibility for neutrality with a wider 
audience. The progressive voting behavior of Ireland in the 
Community and the United Nations and its participation in UN 
peacekeeping efforts, have carved out an independent Ireland, 
separate from Great Britain. Likewise, because of Finnish 
participation in the NNA and their hosting of the CSCE, the Finns 
are recognized as a separate, neutral country, and not a Soviet 
pawn.
The distribution of power has been more of a force in 
Finland than in Ireland, with regard to constraining the policy 
choices available to the leadership. Given the proximity of the 
Soviet Union, Finland must not be a threat to the USSR if it 
wishes to remain an independent Western oriented state. The 
solution worked out by Paasikivi and Kekkonen was the FCMA. This 
document guarantees both Soviet security and Finnish neutrality 
by recognizing that as soon as one is compromised so is the 
other. For example, as long as the West acts nonaggressively 
towards Finnish territory, the Soviet Union will be content to 
respect Finnish neutrality. If the West were to roll through the 
North and threaten Finland's territory, Finnish neutrality would
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be finished as a policy able to reconcile Finnish interests in 
the current distribution of power. The Finns are cognizant of 
this and work for the demilitarization of the North with such 
proposals as the NFWZ and a Scandinavian neutrality.
The Irish, because they lie in an American and British zone 
of interest are, for reasons other than a common political and 
cultural heritage, constrained to a benevolence towards the West. 
But the West would not be likely to threaten Irish territory if 
Ireland were to end this benevolence. The distribution of 
economic power also constrains Ireland to something less than an 
economic and military matters in the same light in its practice 
of neutrality. However, the Irish are not actually threatened by 
NATO power and, in large part, depend upon it for protection.
The Irish are clearly neither economically nor politically 
neutral, as are the Finns. As a member of the Community, Ireland 
is constrained to remain a member of that political and economic 
alliance even in time of war, and to take part in Community 
sanctions aimed against a common aggressor. However, the distri­
bution of economic power has had a far greater effect in 
modifying Ireland's neutrality than it has had on the Finns. 
Finland, unlike Ireland, has been able to achieve a balanced 
trade portfolio with both East and West. The Finns are not 
members of any overtly political economic organization. Instead, 
they cooperate with the Community, EFTA, and CMEA in a manner 
that demarcates Finnish participation from Finnish membership. 
This type of evenhandedness, and awareness of the effect of
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economic policy on the credibility of neutrality, is not a recent 
occurrence in Finland. By accepting German war material in World 
War II, the Finns were punished by the Soviet Union when they 
sued for peace. The next time a decision involved aid from a 
bloc opposed to the Soviets, the Marshall Aid package, the Finns 
elected to turn it down. A precedent dictating neutrality in the 
economic sphere was set and has been adhered to since.
Both Finland and Ireland illustrate the impracticality of 
sustaining a rigid neutrality. In Ireland there is not a 
political consensus among the parties to adhere to a complete 
neutrality shorn of consideration for Western interests. Cer­
tainly Ireland's heritage and its political and economic organi­
zation, define it as Western. Its need to remain economically 
viable dictates that it participate in the Community, and this, 
accordingly, colors its neutrality. The geographic situation of 
Ireland and its woeful defense forces also obligate it to the 
West. But Ireland, if it wishes to fulfill its yearning for an 
identity separate from Great Britain, cannot take the final step 
of joining the Western Alliance and fully integrate itself into 
those states which form the Western power bloc. Neutrality 
affords Ireland an identity, though it is incomplete. But given 
the factors which support it, which include culture, its domestic 
political efficacy, and its need to assert sovereignty, Irish 
neutrality will only be colored by the need to accommodate the 
distribution of power, not be abandoned.
The Finns are also predisposed, because of the domestic
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political balance, and the need to assert sovereignty, to 
continue their neutral policy. The distribution of power is 
accommodated in Finland's case by the FCMA. This treaty colors 
Finnish neutrality, as Community membership does Irish 
neutrality, because of its ramifications in time of war. But it 
does allow for a neutrality that has lasted since the end of 
World War II because it calls for modifications in Finnish 
neutrality and the accommodation of Soviet security interests, 
and adjusts to the strategic balance Finland occupies.
Finnish and Irish neutrality are both imperfect. While one 
pays obeisance to the East, the other takes full advantage of the 
economic wealth of the West, while declining a defense role. In 
both countries there is wide public support for continuing the 
present foreign policy. Neutrality is popular in both Ireland 
and Finland because it is modified to fulfill the needs of their 
political leaders and populace, and guarantees the sovereignty of 
each state. As a state value and state policy, neutrality has 
flourished in Ireland and Finland, but the incompleteness or 
imperfections of each states' neutrality policy, its willingness 
to compromise to accommodate domestic and foreign interests, has 
benefited rather than hindered its survival.
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